ARMENIA AND THE WORLD
An interview with editorial staff of Politique Internationale

Politique Internationale — Mr Nalbandian, you were appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2008, after spending thirty years working abroad. How do you view the world today from the perspective of Yerevan? And what is Armenia’s place in the world?

Edward Nalbandian — The world has become so small that it is difficult to separate the inside from the outside! It is quite impossible to exist in isolation and not see what is going on around you. That is especially true for Armenia and, in a more general way, for the South Caucasus. On the one hand, the region is attempting to become more integrated into the “wider world”; on the other hand, the “wider world” is itself taking an increasing interest in us. Present-day Armenia, known as the Third Republic (First —from 1918 to 1920, and Second, which was part of the USSR —from 1920 to 1991) has to carry the legacy of the realities of its predecessors, with all the attendant consequences. Now we strive to play a possibly significant role in the global processes and to be a predictable and reliable partner. With that in mind, we are increasing bilateral relationships and playing our role in regional European and international organizations, fully engaging in the framework of international organizations.
It should be noted that only a third of our nation lives in Armenia proper. The other two thirds of our compatriots are scattered over more than a hundred states in the world. Completely integrated into the societies of the countries in which they live, the members of the Diaspora have, nevertheless, largely preserved the language and traditions of their ancestors, together with a spiritual link —and not only spiritual —with the motherland. They are all united by the desire to see the fulfilment of their parents’ and grandparents’ dream of a prosperous Armenia. Those people have created dozens of “mini Armenias” throughout the world. The place of Armenia in the world is therefore also defined by the unity of these “Armenians.”
P. I. — Can you elaborate on your point that Armenia has inherited
the legacy of earlier realities?

E. N. — The legacy is manifested in all aspects of state building.: the political and legislative system, which we have swiftly reformed and which we are constantly improving; the economy; the social situation; the educational system; and of course, last but not least, the society itself, with all its attitudes, customs and aspirations. It is also evident, and particularly so, in the complex political and security issues that still need to be resolved.

P. I. — Those issues seem to be especially pertinent to present-day
Armenia — to the Third Republic, as you say...

E. N. — I do not intend to take up the role of a historian, but we should not forget that in order to understand the realities of today we have to look at those of the past. For instance, issues like Nagorno Karabakh or relations between Armenia and Turkey are not new: they are the direct consequences of what took place between the second part of the 19th century and the World War 1. They are, partially, consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. There was no debate on these isseus in the Soviet period, both for ideological reasons and because they had no place in the Cold War practices. The taboo was lifted only after the collapse of the Soviet Union —even though the Soviet authorities had to take notice of the feelings of the Armenian people and authorized the construction in Yerevan, in the 1960s, of an Armenian Genocide memorial. As for the decision to annex Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, that was taken in 1922, on Stalin’s initiative, by the Caucasian bureau of the Bolshevik party, for the purpose of disseminating the Bolshevik ideology in the Muslim Orient. However, for thousands of years Nagorno Karabakh had been an Armenian land populated by Armenians. I leave you to judge the legitimacy and political “rationale” of that annexation...

P. I. — How did the Armenians react to the incorporation of
Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan?
E. N. — Armenians never accepted such injustice. They brought the case before the central Soviet authorities on many occasions requesting them to reconsider the decision. Many activists of the Armenian cause were imprisoned, some even lost their lives... but nothing changed until the time of the Gorbachev de´tente. In February 1988, taking advantage of the relative “freedom” of perestroika, the Armenian auhtorities of Nagorno Karabakh submitted to Moscow, Baku and Yerevan their request for reunification with Armenia. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kremlin was not in a position to propose acceptable solutions. Baku firmly rejected the request and tried to solve the matter in its own way. The Azerbaijani authorities first abolished the autonomy of Nagorno Karabakh. Then they opressed the population of the region —claiming, nonetheless, that they were “their own citizens” —by carrying a genuine ethnic cleansing, supported of the Soviet repressive mechanism, on the pretext of strengthening the system of passport control. And in the end, they unleashed a war. Armenia could not stand by and do nothing. Naturally, it came to the aid of Nagorno Karabakh. In the war which was imposed on us and led to dozens of thousands of deaths on both sides, the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh successfully defended their independence. In 1994, a ceasefire agreement was reached between all the parties in order to resolve the issue through negotiation. Such is the reality inherited by the Third Republic. I described the historic details here to give you a clearer idea of the current situation.

P. I. — Where do the negotiations on the Nagorno Karabagh problem stand at this stage? Despite their efforts, the Minsk Group of the OSCE and its three co-chairs —France, Russia, and the United States —have not yet achieved any notable results, and are being criticized, rightly or wrongly…

E. N. — I do not share that view. Since May 1994, the ceasefire has been mostly respected —only because of the commitment of all parties to the conflict, since there is no presence of international peacekeeping force, and I want to specifically stress this. Even if the situation of “neither war nor peace” is unstable, it is essential that the ceasefire is respected. First, because it has put an end to human losses and, second, because it has made it possible for the parties to focus on the internal problems of their respective countries, such as the consolidation of state institu-tions, economic and social reforms, and to resolve issues resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The ceasefire in Karabakh was maintained also thanks to the relative balance of the military force. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan continues to increase its military budget: more than a dozen times over the last six years...

P. I. — What are the consequences of such a position of Azerbaijan?

E. N. — That policy constitutes a flagrant violation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. And yet, it has not met adequate reaction from the other member states of this Treaty. However, the events in South Ossetia last August clearly demonstrate the danger of excessive accumulation of weapons. In Armenia, we have been conscious of that threat for a long time. We have tried to warn our friends and partners that the arms race in the region could lead to a resumption of military conflict. The situation was somewhat classic if there is a gun on the stage, it has to fire! In any case, we hope that the events around South Ossetia reminded everyone that war is never a solution. And it is not just a matter of Karabagh —when any one state openly prepares for war, it jeopardizes the stability, security and development of the whole region; and such threats should receive an adequaet reaction from the international community.

P. I. — How would you assess the activities of the Minsk Group?

E. N. — A year ago, during the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Madrid, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group submmitted to the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan principles for a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Those principles could serve as a basis to continue the negotiations. Unfortunately, for months after that, the Azerbaijani side chose to disregard the existence of those proposals, and it was not until June this year that the President of Azerbaijan finally agreed at the meeting with the President of Armenia in St Petersburg to continue negotiations on the basis of the Madrid document. After another meeting of the two Presidents in Moscow on 2 November initiated by President Medvedev, the three Heads of States signed a declaration, which underlined the necessity for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict. We believed that the Moscow Declaration would open a new stage in the peace process. But a few days later, the Azerbaijani leaders declared that peaceful resolution was not synonymous to non-use of force. They even went so far as to say that “the military option has never been, is not and never will be excluded as a means to resolve the conflict…”. Although the Moscow Declaration states that the resolution of the conflict has to be based on the norms and principles of international law, Azerbaijan is insisting that settlement should be reached on the basis of a single principle (the respect for the territorial integrity of the state). Moreover, although the declaration clearly stipulates that the negotiation process should be conducted within the framework of the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan is complicating matters by setting parallel tracks to discuss the issue within other international bodies.

P. I. — The OSCE made another statement on the issue during its most recent Ministerial Conference…

E. N. — Indeed. During the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Helsinki on 2 December 2008, the 56 Foreign Ministers of the organization, of which both Armenia and Azerbaijan are members, adopted a declaration on Nagorno Karabakh, which clearly stipulates that the settlement must be reached exclusively by peaceful means and that the positive impetus resulting from the meeting of the Presidents in Moscow must be maintained by pursuing negotiations in co-operation with the co-chairs of the Minsk Group to bring closer the positions of the parties on the basis of the Madrid proposals. Furthermore, in Helsinki, a joint declaration along the same lines was made by the French and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner and Sergei Lavrov, and the US Deputy Secretary of State, Daniel Fried. Armenia fully shares this position. It is our belief that if we are to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, we must continue to negotiate in the spirit of the declarations of Moscow and Helsinki.

P. I. — In practical terms, what are the issues central to the negotiations? And on what principles are they based?

E. N. — Although the details of the negotiations have not yet been unveiled, the principles are known. Much has been written on the subject. At this stage, the negotiations are conducted on the basis of the principles of the basic OSCE documents, especially the Helsinki Final Act —on the non-use of force or threat of force, territorial integrity and the right to self-determination (1). The crucial issue is the final status of Karabakh, the recognition and exercise of the right to self-determination of its people, and their security guarantees, in the broad sense.

P. I. — Azerbaijan has put the issue of the “occupied territories” on the United Nations General Assembly agenda. After “forcing” a resolution on the matter, it is trying to change the format of the negotiations by claiming that the Minsk
Group is “ineffective”. In addition, as you just pointed out, Baku does not exclude the use of military force if the issue drags on. Under such circumstances, is it possible not to wonder about the effectiveness of the current negotiations?

E. N. — There are several explanations for such position of the Baku authorities: the first is that Azerbaijan is trying to bring pressure on Armenia to extract even more compromises; secondly —they are trying to bring pressure on the Minsk Group, and thirdly —such position follows an internal logic.
What is certain is that Azerbaijan cherishes the illusion of being able to easily convert their oil revenues into military dominance and to reach a resolution that would be favorable for them. Those are miscalculations that are delaying the settlement of the conflict. The relative military equilibrium that exists now between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes it still possible to ensure a fragile ceasefire, whereas the arms race can bring no good to anyone. War offers no solutions, as we have already seen. The rare cases of ceasefire violation —a few rounds of sporadic fire here and there —represent considerable danger, particularly given Azerbaijan’s continued militaristic propaganda which has led to almost a third of the population of the country to believe that the armed solution is the only way to put an end to the conflict. In Armenia, on the contrary, you will not find even 1% of the population believeing in it! We are very careful in this matter and we call upon the Azerbaijani side to demonstarte equal responsibility. Attempts to test the military capacity of the other party are extremely dangerous: they might accidentally lead to a military action on a broad scale that would cost our peoples very dearly. Once again, the events around South Ossetia offer a tragic example.

P. I. — What might be the consequences of the Azeri propaganda?

E. N. — First of all, I believe, that it would be more reasonable to prepare the public of our two countries for reconciliation. Alas, in Azerbaijan, the official anti-Armenian propaganda turns into a kind of armenophobia. And to such a degree that if we were to reach an agreement in negotiations tomorrow, the Azerbaijani side might well declare that their people will not accept it — which has happened once, when after the agreement made on the “Paris principles” (2) Azerbaijan declared that public opinion in the country was not ready to accept it. The Azerbaijani propaganda has also targeted the Minsk Group, which is a rather strange position. On the one hand, our neighbours are inviting France, Russia and the United States to act as mediators, and on the other hand, are criticising them. The result is that 82% of the Azerbaijanis are now opposed to the mediation of the Minsk Group.
You mentioned the settlement proposal submitted by Azerbaijan to the United Nations General Assembly. I must remind that the draft resolution was formally approved by only 39 of the 192 members of the United Nations. Furthermore, the vote revealed another fact: the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group voted against the proposal, and the overwhelming majority of member states —including all the members of the European Union —refused to support it. They did so for a very simple reason: the text was biased and non-constructive as it highlighted only one principle of international law —territorial integrity — and ignored the other principles, starting from the right of peoples to self-determination, which we believe is irroveocable.

P. I. — Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, followed in August by Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Could these events be considered precedents for the case of Nagorno Karabakh?

E. N. — We are often asked that. We have always answered that every conflict has its own nature and its own logic. It is true that we could have used the precedent of Kosovo, as well as those of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and recognized them… and then officially recognized the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. In fact, in terms of international law, the arguments put forward in favour of the independence of these three regions are valid for Karabakh. I would even say that they are even more valid for Karabakh! But, I repeat, at this stage, the negotiations on Nagorno Karabakh are going on and we hope to find a compromise solution that would respect the concerns of all parties.

P. I. — In the spring of 2008, Serge Sargsyan succeeded Robert Kocharian as the President of Armeina. Has this change at the head of government altered Armenia’s position on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh and, more generally, on the foreign policy of your country?

E. N. — As President Sargsyan stated in his inaugural address, there would be no substantial changes in our foreign policy, other than the reinforcement of some priorities. We continue an active, multilateral, multidirectional foreign policy, aimed, as it always has, at easing the tensions in our region, at establishing relationships of co-operation and good neighbourhood with the countries of the region and at ensuring a broad international engagement, which we hope, will lead to the consolidation of stability, security, peace, development and prosperity in the South Caucasus and beyond.

P. I. — Armenia seems to have very close ties with Russia, which considers you its best ally in the whole South Caucasus region. And indeed it was to Moscow that Mr Sarkissian made his first visit as President in June…

E. N. — For us, Russia is a strategic partner; and although some may try to find other shades of meaning in the close relations between Armenia and Russia, there is nothing to hide. Our peoples are linked by an centuries-old friendship and a deep mutual liking, which we hope to strengthen even further. That does not mean, however, that while remaining faithful to the commitments we have made as allies of Russia, we do not wish to improve our relations in every direction: we are determined to strengthen our ties with the United States; to consolidate our co-operation with the European institutions and nations; to strengthen the relations existing with our neighbours and to establish new ones with all other nations.

P. I. — What about Turkey? The issue of relations between Armenia and Turkey has always been especially complicated. How do you envisage these relations in the future? What concrete actions have you undertaken to improve them?

E. N. — At the beginning of June, President Sargsyan invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gu¨l, to visit Yerevan to attend a qualifying football game between the national teams of Armenia and Turkey. President Gu¨l gave the matter considerable thought before responding to the invitation. It is possible that the August events around South Ossetia may have influenced his final decision. Or perhaps there were other reasons as well.Be that as it may, a few days before the game of 6 September, President Gu¨l accepted the invitation. We realize that for him this was not an easy decision, but it was certainly a wise decision and we welcome it.
Unfortunately, the Armenian team lost the football match; but “football diplomacy” was the winner. We might even say that this concept now has a place in diplomatic vocabulary. The meeting between the two presidents on 6 September in Yerevan established a favourable atmosphere. The Ministers of Foreign affairs of the two countries were tasked with starting negotiations to normalize bilateral relations. Since then, my Turkish counter-part, Ali Babacan, and I have had many meetings that I can describe as constructive and extremely useful. Our two most recent meetings took place in Istanbul on 24 November in the context of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization, which Armenia is currently chairing, and in Helsinki on 4 December, during the OSCE ministerial.

P. I. — What do you mean by “normalization of bilateral relations”?

E. N. — In concrete terms, we want to see the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of borders. Armenia is prepared to do these without any preconditions. We hope that Turkey is prepared to do the same.
On this subject, I have to make it clear that it is not fair to present the possible opening of the borders as a favour that the Turks would do for the Armenians. The Turkish side is no less interested in it than we are.
Similarly, neither of us would be doing the other a favour by accepting the establishment of diplomatic relations. Both countries need it. Such a development would be in the interest of both our nations.
Everywhere in the world, many neighbouring countries have differences but they create appropriate conditions to dicuss them —normal relations, open borders, opennes to each other —which allow them to tackle matters of concern.

P. I. — The Turks are accusing you of having brought the issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide to the internationalarena, and of making territorial claims to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

E. N. — Genocide is a crime against humanity. As such, it concerns humanity as a whole and not only the people that were its victim. Moreover, the descendants of the victims of the Genocide are not only in Armenia but also in many countries around the world, and no one can deprive them of the right to remember, just as no one can ask the Jews to forget the Holocaust. I want to make this absolutely clear —as I have done many times in the past —that no Armenian official ever has asked, nor will ask, the Armenian Diaspora to stop its demand for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. It is absolutely impossible.
As for the territorial claims, it is quite simple: Armenia has never made any statement to this effect.
Finally, as far as Nagorno Karabakh is concerned, I would like to remind that Turkey is also a member of the Minsk Group. Hence, it is under an obligation to remain neutral and to maintain an impartial and balanced position in the matter.
I am convinced that we must move beyond the old grievances and engage in constructive dialogue. Perhaps I am an optimist, but I believe in future reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey.

P. I. — The issue of Armenia and Turkey is also raised in the context of the Turkey’s accession negotiaitons with the EU: the Europeans are calling on Turkey to settle its disputes with your country. How does Armenia view the European future of Turkey? Do you think that Turkey should recognize the
Armenian genocide before joining the European Union —as the French President Jacques Chirac said during his visit to Armenia in September 2006? Or do you think that Turkey should not belong to the Union, as President Sarkozy stated?

E. N. — It is for the peoples and member states of the EU to decide whether any particular country fulfils or does not fulfil the criteria of the Union. In any case —who would not want to have a neighbour that fully subscribes to the European values?

P. I. — You often speak of the common interests of the South Caucasus. But the gas pipelines and oil pipelines bypass your country, the railways and roads are closed on three sides, and you do not have access to the sea…

E. N. — I think that such situation benefits no one. Of course it causes Armenia losses but can one imagine that anyone wins anything? Even Azerbaijan and Turkey — which for the last 15 years have imposed blockade on us —are not gaining from it, either politically or economically. The railways connecting Russia to Turkey and Iran pass through Armenia (crossing Georgia and Azerbaijan). But they are not operational because of the closure of the borders. Consequently, Azerbaijan and Turkey are forced to spend huge amounts of money to build new ones. The situation with the major north–south roads crossing Armenia is similar —they are not used for the same reasons. Armenia is the shortest and quickest route for the transport of energy… and yet the other states are investing huge sums of money in order to bypass it.
Despite these obstacles, Armenia continues to develop. Our economic achievements speak for themselves: we have recorded an average annual growth of 12% over the last eight years. We are fully integrated into the international community which considers us a reliable partner. In short, the blockade imposed upon us has afforded no economic or political benefit to anyone. And yet opening of the borders and freedom of movement for goods and persons would be extremely profitable for all the countries in the region. Those who are losing the most are, of course, the ordinary people in the South Caucasus.
Armenia has made several proposals to establish conditions favourable to economic co-operation and to launch joint projects which would not only contribute to the development of our countries but, in addition, would decrease tension and promote the resolution of the most complex problems. Regional economic cooperation dictates that no country is excluded from it, since such exclusion can lead to an inadequate development of the region. All that I can say today is that we maintain this position.

P. I. — Another major neighbour of Armenia, Iran, is the focus of international attention. You maintain good relations with that country. If I am not mistaken, an Iranian–Armenian gas pipeline is under construction at the moment, and you have other projects as well in the energy sector. During the years of blockade and power crisis, Iran has always provided you with a crucial routes for supplies. Is the current tension a source of concern to you?

E. N. — Of course it worries us! We hope that the issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme will be resolved through diplomatic means. With regard the South Caucasus Tehran has always adopted a balanced position and has attempted to contribute as far as possible to the settlement of existing conflicts. We appreciate that. The political and economic relations between Armenia and Iran are based on mutual interest. I was recently in Tehran where I had meetings with the highest political leadership. We discussed the prospects for deepening our bilateral co-operation, especially in the energy and transport sectors, where there are plans for serious projects.

P. I. — If the conflict between Iran and America were to deepen and the United States ask for your support, what would be your response?

E. N. — I prefer not to envisage such a situation. We favour a peaceful resolution of conflicts. We will do everything in our power in this regard.

P. I. — The three countries of the South Caucasus form part of the EU European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) (3). But with respect to the regional organizations, the three countries seem to be rather divided (4). At a time when Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh represent sources of serious tension, surely such dispersal is excessive in such a small region?

E. N. — Yes, that is probably true. Such situation clearly shows that the political processes in the South Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union are not yet complete. As you know, the Caucasus is one of the most sensitive areas in the world. Since very ancient times, many peoples, religions, cultures and civilizations have co-existed there. Today, there is a real danger that we shall see lines of separation appearing in the region, a development that we do not encourage. The current situation and trends in the South Caucasus and the neighbouring countries require from each of us maximum restraint and responsibility.

P. I. — In view of the fact that for fifteen years Turkey has kept the borders with Armenia closed, Iran and Georgia are the only means of communication for your country with the outside world. How did you react to the conflict between Russia and Georgia last summer?

E. N. — The events around South Ossetia, which caused enormous damage and much human tragedy, have obviously concerned us. Because of those events, Armenia’s economy has suffered losses that we estimated at around $600 million. Supplies to our country were considerably disrupted. Armenia is probably one of the countries most interested in the stability and security of our neighbour Georgia —not only because over 70% of our trade is conducted via Georgian territory but also because our two nations are linked by ancient friendship.

P. I. — Concerning the events of last summer in Georgia, there are two opposing points of view: 1) Russia merely responded, albeit with very strong-arm tactics, to an irresponsible provocation on the part of the Georgian president; 2) Russia is guilty of unprecedented aggression against a sovereign state which is a member of the United Nations. Which of these two views is closest to your own?

E. N. — The war was a terrible tragedy. It is crucial now to unite our efforts to avoid a repetition of such a disaster. We should be looking ahead.We believe that the agreements reached through the efforts of the French and Russian Presidents form a serious basis for the peaceful resolution. Armenia’s position on this issue was expressed in the declaration of the Heads of States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, where Armenia currently holds the chairmanship.

P. I. — What is your view of the agreement signed between Russia and the EU in Moscow on 8 September? Do you see it as a victory for the EU (which brought the crisis to an end) or for Russia (which succeeded in confirming the ultimate secession of the two independentist regions of Georgia)?

E. N. — In this situation, I do not believe that it is wise to try to determine who won and who lost. The important thing is that the agreement works. The weapons have fallen silent and there are no more human losses and casualties. What is needed now is supervision of the implementation of the agreement to certify that each party fulfils its commitments properly and to do everything possible to ensure that the Geneva negotiations which bring together all parties to the conflict reach the expected outcomes.

P. I. — The region of Javakhk, in Georgia, which is populated mainly by Armenians, is another source of tension in the region. Might the precedent of South Ossetia encourage Armenia to challenge the issue of the borders inherited from the Soviet Union?

E. N. — I do not share your assessment of the tensions in Javakhk. It is true that the social and economic situation in this region is difficult, but it has recently been the subject of special attention on the part of the Georgian authorities, with whom we are constantly engaged in constructive discussion. On the issue of the border between Armenia and Georgia, I want to be absolutely clear: we have never questioned it and have no intention of doing so.

P. I. — Can Russia be seen as a threat to regional security?

E. N. — Russian policy in the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union shows that the wording of such question would not be correct. We should remember it is precisely thanks to active Russian involvement that a ceasefire which put an end to the Nagorno Karabakh war was established in 1994. Basically, we consider Russia to be an important factor for the stability, security and co-operation of the region.

P. I. — The situation in the Caucasus is particularly complex, as the case of your country clearly illustrates. On one hand, you are a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization —a military alliance in which Moscow plays a central role — and Russia has a large military land base in the north of the country, as well as an airbase not far from Yerevan. On the other hand, Armenia is involved in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” programme, receives considerable American military aid and has sent troops to Iraq. How do you position yourself between Russia and the United States? Do you plan to become
a member of NATO?

E. N. — You are right —the situation in the region is anything but simple! Last summer’s conflict in South Ossetia made it clear that a slightest careless act can turn the Caucasus into an explosive device. We are all aware of it.
For our own part, we are engaged in close co-operation with NATO. During the NATO-Armenia meeting in Brussels, the Alliance expressed its content over the way we have successfully conducted the two years of IPAP. We are now finalizing the drafting of the next programme. Our good relations with the Alliance should not lead you to think that we are about to request membership —it is not part of Armenian policy’s agenda.
As for the Collective Security Treaty Organization, that is a military and political structure that regulates the strategic relations of member states. Our membership of the CSTO helps to guarantee our security.

P. I. — In this context, how did you react to the initiative of Turkey to form a “Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Plat-form” (5)?

E. N. — In our region, co-operation and security are issues that we have to discuss on a permanent basis. Hence, we can only welcome the idea of a project that aims to improve co-operation, mutual trust and security —even if there are still certain points to be clarified, beginning with the format and mechanisms of this platform.
P. I. — What are your plans regarding the European Union?

E. N. — One of the priorities of our foreign policy is rapprochement with Europe. That desire is expressed in the close co-operation that we maintain with European organizations. As I have said we are actively engaged in the European Neighbour-hood Policy. When President Sarkissian visited Brussels in November, and also during the Armenia–European Union Cooperation Council in December, the Union indeed congratu-lated us on the quality of our implementation of the Action Plan. Armenia also welcomes the Eastern Partnership initiative (6). We see in it an additional means of bringing EU and Armenia even closer.

P. I. — To conclude this interview, we should like to return to our initial question: how does Armenia see itself? Through its historical and cultural roots, it is fully embedded in European civilization; it was one of the first Christian nations; but during its history it has formed part of Persia, Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, as well as of Russia for the last two centuries. In the final analysis, does Armenia belong to the East or to the West?

E. N. — It is true that through our roots and values, we consider ourselves Europeans. It is also true that history and geography have had a profound influence on our country. In short, we have a little of everything in our country. I think that this diversity is the source of our richness, as well as the specific nature and charm of the Caucasus…
 

(1) Signed in 1975, the Helsinki Final Act defines the norms and principles of action of the CSCE (which became the OSCE in 1995). These principles include: non-recourse to the threat or the use of force; respect of the territorial integrity of states; and the right of peoples for self-determination.
(2) On 26 January 2001, through the mediation of President Chirac, Presidents Kocharian and Aliev held negotiations in Paris which resulted in an agreement called the “Paris Principles.” On the basis of that agreement, the OSCE Minsk Group mediators drafted a text and presented it to the two Presidents in April 2001, at Key West, Florida. Presidents Kocharian and Aliev made final amendments to the text. The peace agreement seemed ready but, after his return to Baku, President Aliev rejected the proposal on the grounds that the elites, as well as Azerbaijani public opinion, were not ready to accept it.
(3) Launched in November 2002, at the Prague Summit, the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) were made available to countries showing the political will and the capacity to strengthen their relations with NATO. Drawn up on a biannual basis, these plans are designed to bring together within a single framework all the various mechanisms of co-operation through which the interactions between a partner country and the Alliance are deployed, targeting more precise activities in order to better support its internal reform efforts. Armenia established its IPAP with NATO on 16 December 2005.
(4) Armenia and Azerbaijan are still part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but Georgia left the organization last August; Azerbaijan and Georgia are participating in GUAM (a diplomatic and economic structure for co-operation considered “pro-western” which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) while Armenia belongs to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, a pro-Russian military alliance founded in Moscow in 1992, which includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan); finally, of the three Caucasus states, only Georgia has officially presented its candidacy to NATO.
(5) In autumn 2008, Turkey announced its desire to establish a Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform (CSCP) —a plan that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan, states is not intended to “become an alternative to any institution, mechanism or any international organization that deals with the problems of the Caucasus. On the contrary, it is an additional platform to facilitate the communication between the countries of the region, a framework to develop stability, confidence and co-operation, a forum for dialogue.” See Ali Babacan, “Calming the Caucasus”, International Herald Tribune, 23 September 2008.
(6) Presented at the beginning of December 2008, by the European Commission, the Eastern Partnership initiative —which many analysts consider represents for the EU the equivalent in the East of what the Mediterranean Union will be in the South —is intended to intensify the relations of the Union with the six states situated on its eastern borders: Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Belarus (on condition that President Lukashenko agrees to democratize his government). The first summit in the framework of this Eastern Partnership is to be held in May 2009.