I have the honor to present to your attention the basic provisions of the draft constitution drawn up by the Constitutional Commission of the Parliament of the Republic, putting emphasis merely on the most important principles and methodological issues.

From the methodological viewpoint, the draft of the Constitutional Commission is based on the following main principles: to regard the constitution as a purely legal document designed to ensure the lasting stability and effective activity of the state; to renounce situationally opportune solutions; to avoid political compromises; and to be guided solely by legal considerations, taking as a basis international experience and the legislative tradition of our independent state. Just as important also is the principle that any crisis situation that lacks a constitutional solution must be excluded from the life of the state and society.

First, concerning situationally opportune solutions and political compromises. It is no secret, and it is even sometimes said publicly in this connection, that the easiest way to adopt a constitution would be as follows: to adapt to the present correlation of political forces represented in parliament and to attempt to find some mutually acceptable version.

This would, indeed, be the easiest, but at the same time the most dangerous, way for the state because, considering the variability of the correlation of political forces, it is not hard to divine the kind of future upheavals of which a constitution adopted in this way would be the cause. It would be the primary business of each newly elected parliament to immediately adapt the constitution to the new correlation of political forces, and so on ad infinitum. That is, the present struggle of the legislature and the executive to wrest powers away from one another, which is characteristic of all young independent states, would be a permanent factor of destabilization, with all the obvious negative consequences.

Mutual concessions, meanwhile, are encouraged as essential in the spheres of social interaction, the political modus operandi, and diplomacy, but wholly unacceptable in the spheres of ideology and, particularly, jurisprudence. Consequently, for a constitution, which unequivocally belongs to the latter sphere, the possibility and the expediency of political compromise should be considered excluded. Even if guided by opportune considerations of convenience, we do not have the right to jeopardize the future stability of the state.

The mere fact that it belongs in the sphere of jurisprudence, on the other hand, makes the following principle virtually obligatory for any constitution: the need to learn from international experience, provided that contemporary law has been shaped historically as the result of the collective thought of mankind.

In this connection the draft of the Constitutional Commission almost totally reflects the principles of state independence and all the state provisions of international laws concerning the rights of man and citizen, and also the system of checks and balances developed for the harmonious activity of state structures of modern democratic countries.

As far as the legislative tradition of the newly independent Armenian state is concerned, the present draft constitution takes the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, the laws on the president of the republic and the Parliament, and the law on the basic provisions of independent statehood as its starting documents. The said documents, which are the results exclusively of the activity of the present Parliament, are not reflected in the Constitutional Commission's draft with absolute accuracy, of course, but have undergone serious revisions based both on the demands of the present time and conformity to the current level of our legal and political maturity.

Taking this into account, I consider it my duty to observe that I am in no way disposed to think of the four years that have elapsed without a constitution as lost time. On the contrary, I consider these years to have been an effective time for the formation of new state structures, the creation of the corresponding legislation, and the testing of the adopted laws, which will undoubtedly have a salutary impact on the future constitution of the republic. And even though a pessimistic or negative mood prevails in Parliament today, nonetheless, from a historical point of view its role in the elaboration of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia is already indisputable.

The present draft embodies, and with all due consistency, I believe, the principle providing for constitutional solutions for all possible crisis situations in the life of the state and society, which is the sole guarantor for the avoidance of undesirable forms of domestic political struggle and civil war. There is no particular need, I believe, to illustrate this danger, inasmuch as its best illustration is today's situation. It is obvious that the domestic political tension that is predominant today both in Armenia and in other republics of the former Soviet Union is to the highest extent the result of the simple reality that the constitution and the laws do not provide for legal solutions to critical situations

The draft of the Constitutional Commission accomplishes this task fully in my opinion. Specifically, it excludes the possibility of the stymieing of the adoption of the most important laws presented by the government, including the state budget, facilitates as a counterbalance the procedure for the expression of no confidence in the government. It developed in detail a mechanism for the removal from of face of the president of the republic in the event of his having committed serious crimes. And finally, as an extreme means for surmounting crisis situations, it provides for the possibility of the dissolution of the National Assembly and the scheduling of special elections. It is important to mention also in this connection that the National Assembly and the president of the republic are equally endowed with the exclusive right to schedule a referendum, which ensures both the possibility of avoiding undesirable confrontations and the handing over to the verdict of the people of contradictions that have arisen.

All the principles that have been set forth, which would hardly be cause for serious objection, have at this time, however, been set forth only on paper, and their actual application is as yet, understandably, still attended by great difficulties. We encounter once again here the ill-fated question of the procedure for the adoption of the constitution. Having once fallen into the humiliating trap of the Stalin-Brezhnev Constitution, surely we would find within ourselves the power to cut this Gordian knot. Are there, however, doubts that, in the event of Parliament's adoption of the constitution, all the said principles would be subordinated to the demands of the political marketplace and that a delayed-action bomb would thereby be placed in the foundations of our state? I am forced to repeat again and again, therefore, that under the conditions of the current political situation, only a constitution adopted by way of a public referendum, with the condition that it would subsequently be revised also only by way of a referendum, could be a dependable guarantee of the stability of the state.

And now about substantive aspects of the actual content of the Constitutional Commission' s draft.

It has to be noted first and foremost that this draft makes a provision for the preservation of the system of presidential rule of the republic. This has to be noted because it is this, essentially, that is the main subject of the tumultuous arguments surrounding the constitution. And this is absolutely understandable, in as much as the fate of the constitution will ultimately depend on the question of the kind of system of government that the Republic of Armenia will adoptհ presidential or parliamentary. It is perfectly certain also, that in the event of consensus on this matter being reached, the procedure of adoption of the constitution would become a purely technical task that is easily solved.

Considering the true seriousness and justification of this alternative, I consider absolutely unacceptable the cheap demagogic methods with which an attempt is being made to portray the presidential system as a despotic, and the parliamentary system, as a democratic form of rule. In any event, historical experience has shown that tyrannies and fascist regimes have been born in parliamentary republics far more often than in presidential republics.

So the counterpoise of the presidential and parliamentary systems on a democratic basis should be considered fundamentally mistaken and unacceptable. The indicator of a state's democratic principles is not the presidential or parliamentary nature of the system of government, but whether a form of government by means of free elections has been established or not. What else, ultimately, is the essence of democracy if not free elections by which means the people have an opportunity, if not to elect invariably good authorities, then, at least, to rid themselves of bad ones.

Thus, from the viewpoint of democracy, states are distinguished from one another not on the basis of the system of government but whether the authorities are elected or not. And for this reason both the presidential and parliamentary systems are equally democratic if they have been installed by means of free elections, and accordingly, tyrannies and monarchies installed by different paths are undemocratic.

I have been forced to weary you, having dared to dwell in detail on these simple and hackneyed truths, because the depiction of the presidential system as a tyranny is already threatening to become a subject of delusive speculation.

Essentially, the choice of a presidential or parliamentary system of government is connected not with the fact of democracy, but with the question of the extent to which one of these systems corresponds to the demands and peculiarities of the state and to what extent it is capable of tackling the tasks confronting this state.

This way of framing the issue would be entirely apposite and to the point were it the substance not of a contrived but of a serious philosophical dispute. It is hard, of course, within the framework of this speech of a general nature around this important matter to present a comprehensively argued analysis, and I shall attempt at this time, therefore, to content myself with an exposition merely of several basic propositions, even though they might not contain anything new for you.

I am once again forced in this connection, first, to call your attention to one false proposition by which an attempt is being made to elevate the question of the propriety of the presidential or parliamentary system to the level of a phenomenon of a national-psychological nature. Statements may be heard frequently to the effect that "the parliamentary system corresponds more than the presidential system to our national character and national mentality" and vice versa, the groundlessness of which is obvious prima facie.

The question of the preference of a presidential or parliamentary system is, in fact, connected not with national or psychological factors but with state traditions, the level of development of the civil society, and the degree of formation of democratic institutions. Discussion of the matter could even make sense, therefore, only from this angle and provided that a common methodological starting point is established.

And this common starting point, in my opinion, is as follows. To what extent-is the system of government that is preferred from the specific angle of the development of statehood and society capable of catering to the efficient and smooth functioning of the legislature, the executive and, the third factor, the independence of the judiciary?

Before turning to a discussion of this question, it is worth ascertaining what the essential and fundamental difference between the presidential and parliamentary systems of government is.

It is by no means a question of terms. A state may have a president elected even by parliament or by public ballot, but not in reality be presidential. It is essentially a question of which authority forms the government. If it is the president, we are dealing with a presidential system. If the said right is accorded to parliament, this is a parliamentary republic, regardless of whether it has a president or not. Legal niceties play no part here.

From the formal viewpoint, the fundamental, albeit not absolute, principle of the separation of powers is violated in a parliamentary republic, since the executive is wholly dependent on the legislature. The formal aspect would be of no significance, of course, were it not for the negative influence of this dependence on the viability of the system of government and the efficiency of the activity of the legislature and the executive.

No one could, of course, deny the viability of a parliamentary system, but no one could deny either the fact that the parliamentary system is viable only in states in which one or, at the most, two or three serious mass parties, each of which is capable of forming a parliamentary majority and, thanks to this, ensuring the effective activity of the government, has taken shape historically. In the event of the election of patchwork, multiparty parliaments, the parliamentary system leads to the formation of a weak coalition government and incessant internal upheavals, which very often end in coup, tyranny and, frequently, outside interference.

In the event of a parliamentary system being established, the same sorry and disastrous fate, I profoundly believe, awaits Armenia because one, two or three mass parties could take shape here in a dozen years, at best.

I consider it superfluous to substantiate this conviction of mine with historical facts, of which there are a multitude. Although it is worth recalling in this connection the experience of the first Armenian Republic when, in its two and one-half years of existence, there were four changes of government. Nor have we forgotten, I believe, the first thirteen months of post-communist Armenia, which should be seen as a most tense period of confrontation between the republic's parliament and the government, for in the shortest time first the parliament voluntarily relinquished its powers to form a government, then things reached the point of the government resigning.

Thus, for at least several years into the future, there will be no alternative to the presidential form of government in the Republic of Armenia, in all probability. Even if, thanks to a confluence of circumstances, parliamentary government were to be restored in Armenia, our republic would several years later, all the same, return to a presidential system, but at the price of tremendous deprivations and incalculable losses. I am sure, however, that our people will not make this absurd mistake.

I have already said that the viability of the system of government of this state or the other is conditioned by the extent to which it caters to the effective activity of the legislature, the executive, and the independence of a third authorityհthe judiciary.

Aside from the elaboration of precise mechanisms fully balancing and ensuring the productive activity of Parliament and the government, the draft of the Constitutional Commission has successfully resolved also, in my opinion, the problem of the independence of the judiciary.

The main guarantee of the independence of the judiciary according to this draft is the appointment of the judges for life. This guarantee is strengthened considerably by the inclusion in the system of the judiciary of two new institutionsհthe Council of Justice and the Constitutional Court, which will be performed on a proportional basis by the president of the republic and the National Assembly.

The Council of Justice will present to the president of the republic candidates for deputy chairman of the Supreme Court, and will present findings on the nominees for justices and in respect to the suspension and termination of the authority of justices.

The main competence of the Constitutional Court is the establishment of the constitutional conformity of laws, National Assembly decrees, and presidential edicts. The clearest evidence of the independence of the Constitutional Court is the fact that its decisions are final and not subject to review, which precludes any possibility of any pressure being brought to bear on it on the part of the president of the republic or the National Assembly.

A most important achievement of the draft of the Constitutional Commission should be considered the section devoted to questions of territorial government and local government, the essence of which consists in the rejection of the idea of territorial self-government, which is incongruous for Armenia.

This innovation, which at first sight seems staggering, is justified, however, by the unique reality ensuing from the particular features of our country and convincing arguments.

The formation of administrative-territorial units is, as a rule, a result of a historical process that emerged as a consequence of feudal divisions reflecting the separate settlement of the population in multinational states. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that geographical and economic factors might have played a certain part in the formation of administrative-territorial units. But historical and ethnic factors have in all cases been decisive, especially since economic and geographical entities very often coincided with the borders of feudal or ethnic domains.

Thus, the principle of territorial self-government ensues even in the most democratic countries not from the standpoint of republic interests or managerial expediency, but is preserved simply as a historical burden, which at times leads to serious clashes between state and local interests. Territorial self-government, aggravated by distinctive local interests, a proprietary budget, and sundry privileges, inevitably contains within it the element of federation, which is incongruous with the ever growing aspirations to the formation of unitary states. Until these aspirations are justified, states attempt by means of laws to reduce to a minimum the contradictions that exist between state and local interests, but only a few, and only for a while, as a rule, succeed in achieving a complete harmony of interests.

Armenia, free of this historical burden and being in terms of its composition a mono-national country, has an opportunity, unique in the world, to create a classical unitary state, which could be the most dependable guarantee of its stability, territorial integrity and genuine independence.