After a careful rereading of the Chairman's perception paper of the Charter for European Security (PC.SMC/48/99) this delegation would like to make the following comments addressed at the overall orientation of the draft. We will contribute more specific editorial suggestions as drafting activities progress.

May we at the outset express our appreciation for the prodigious amount of work already done by the CiO and our envious admiration for his capacity to stay the course in the face of seemingly unmanageable and sprawling issues and mechanisms.

On the whole the organization of the document into a Preamble and general statement followed by the operational documents is a sound one. We had no objections when it was first presented at the march 26th meeting of the reinforced P.C. However a closer look at this paper as it has evolved and as seen in its entirety, evokes a sense of partial disappointment.

First the first part. The overall impression appears to us as that of a document that lacks boldness of vision. Compared to the Helsinki Final Act adopted during the Cold War, this Charter reads more like a guidebook, more preoccupied with the status quo then envisioning the dynamics for an evolving Europe. Forced stability is no guarantor of security. It is an attempt at maintaining the status quo coercively. It very selectively tilts towards those principles in the founding Acts, which, had they been taken alone, and out of context, the map of Europe would not have changed since 1975.

The consolidation of the progress is a legitimate objective. True, the OSCE must build on its success: deepen existing commitments and expand activities that were proven fruitful. But it must first venture into a more daring understanding of the present and future characteristics of the European international system. The end of bipolarity is not the end rivalries or the coagulation of new forms of politico-military blocks. Was it so easy to decree the unsuitability of spheres of influence in the OSCE area? The coalescing of several states into subgatherings within the OSCE is likely to lead to the isolation of those whose only home is the OSCE.

Similarly there is reflected in this document the failure to draw the lessons of our recent experiences in recent conflicts, especially those that are often represented as internal conflicts.

After the Kosovo disaster it would be unlikely to assume that security structures and principles in Europe will go back to business as usual. Whole states, Alliances, Unions as well as international organizations will have to accommodate themselves not only to new realities on the ground, but to the necessity of theories and doctrines, principles and norms having to catch up with the consequences of practices and actions that can no longer fit neatly together: the kind of categories that the OSCE seems so gingerly to take for granted.

It has been said that "there are two futures, the future of desire and the future of fate, and man's reason has never learned to separate them". Our proposed Document Charter illustrates very well this insight. To read through it is to feel that instability can be mitigated by good will and democratization, without taking into account the objective social, economic, political and historical causes of conflict within the multinational states. It is of course desirable to respect the law, but it is very difficult to make laws worth respecting, or even apply them in a way that foster legitimacy rather then resistance and alienation. Democratization is not simply the result of clever electoral laws and fair elections. It is the result of, and dependent on, a culture of democratic values. A culture of democracy is not an artificial construct that can be grafted by fiat or magic, from top down, or from the outside in, designed by experts, monitors, commissioners, NGOs and even decent leadership. Of course, all this can help and the OSCE is right in recognizing as well as providing for their availability and utilization. But more then anything, democratization and politics legitimacy, citizenship, tolerance and fair play, a vision of the state as more that the domain of a clan, ethnicity, religion and party is a modern construct: a construction in an ongoing process of realization.

Modernity and modernization are required foundations of democratization, which itself is never fully completed. Some countries and societies are further along in this process. Encouraged by the benefits that accrue to them through the dual implantation of modernization and democratization they are willing to go deeper, more comprehensively and irreversibly in that direction. Prosperity, social peace, equitable order, reduced violence, personal and collective security are the tangible benefits people in modern democratic societies expect and receive from legitimate governments.

This is certainly not the case where the modernization is not complete. In some instances it has barely begun. It is the challenge of the OSCE to recognize this fact and work through it. It is not by wishing it, that this profound gap will go away. Nor is it by assuming that resistance is simply due to bad fate or corrupt leadership. This sociological fact must be addressed. It is and will remain at the origin of much conflict and tension, and is likely to get exacerbated rather than mitigated, as the vested interests and existing schemes of power distribution are threatened and undermined in various societies in transition. To those caught in this process the rosy future is too slow in coming, the reassuring familiarity of existing relations are undeniable and difficult to abandon. The transition process itself is destabilizing and leads to too many contradictions and tensions.

Mr. Chairman,

A future of desire ignores these facts. A future of fate withdraws in despair and lets chaos rain. But the future of informed action distinguishes between the two and creates the conditions for a scheme that takes into account the enormous diversity that is the hallmark of the OSCE community. The Europe of the OSCE is characterized by an extreme unevenness of socio-economic and political development. Change and development are not only affecting societies internally but also the relation between them. The rule of law is more a formula than a living reality.

Even the great, established democracies are experiencing transformative challenges, stresses due to the pull of centralization and decentralization, devolution, integration and disagregation, the strains of migration, xenophobia and erosion of identity and counterclaims of subnational identities. Thinking twenty years ahead, it is hard to see the present map frozen. The system is dynamic, with great tendencies toward entropy. It is incumbent upon this Charter not to define security too narrowly as being the result of the maintenance of the status quo. If the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia does not lead us to a sober pause, we will be forced to witness other Yugoslavias, not prevent them.

For how can we, in all seriousness, with sincerity, innocence or naivete, or is it cynicism, insert paragraph 3 of section VI "National Minorities"(pg.49 of PC.SMC/48/99):

I shall read:

"The participating States, reaffirming the importance of Principle IV of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States set out in the Helsinki Final Act, should ensure that persons belonging to national minorities enjoy all human rights and are able to exercise their fundamental freedoms both individually and in community with others. Failure by States to implement their commitments in this area has been a major cause of threats to security. A forthcoming policy towards national minorities is the best way to preserve the territorial integrity of participating States. At the same time it has to be emphasized that persons belonging to national minorities must employ only peaceful means, such as elections, referendums, plebiscites and petitions, to exercise their rights."

Is this a misunderstanding of the Helsinki Final Act? It this about national minorities, their rights, aspirations and their fundamental freedoms, or is it about preserving territorial integrity? And this emphasis on peaceful means. Of course, peaceful, legal means are preferable. But don't they assume the existence of the rule of law, a functioning constitution, an independent judiciary, police under civilian control, fair elections, non-sectarian structures, non-sectarian military, etc. If in fact the functioning democracies would provide these mechanisms and allow the minorities the effective exercise of their political rights, the legitimacy of the state, its government and its boundaries (and sovereignty) would not be challenged. But what if they don't. Who guarantees those rights? Who determines when abuse, arbitrariness and repression, legally carried out, contradict the letter and the spirit of Helsinki Final Act.

Clearly, we have a dilemma. Either this paragraph, and its contradiction are endemic to our entire approach, hence text, but make it by their very double talk acceptable to certain participating states - and therefore signable - or they reflect the belief that what can be reconciled in a text can be reconciled in reality, by ignoring, so to speak the fine print.

From the congress of Vienna to the treaty of Versailles we are often reminded by those who believe in the magic ability of documents that it is possible to freeze historical progress and suppress conflicts and impose peace and stability. They claim that in Europe, this has been a tested and reliable method. There is of course a contrary view, which we would be remiss by not mentioning. Forces artificially suppressed by Great Power politics, when they do get unleashed, the explosions reverberate for a long time, the devastation is enormous and the losses cataclysmic.

The purpose of this Charter should not be to make artificial stability to look real; outlawing conflict for the sake of stability is a wishful form of self-deception. Realism would require instead to provide mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts between competing interests. Responsive politics and creative diplomacy require no less. The OSCE needs a strategy for the legitimate management of change. At times, cosmetic surgery is not sufficient. More may be needed. And we owe it to ourselves to admit it.