Q. Minister, what is your assessment of Armenian-Turkish relations today? Is there any activity?

A. It is unfortunate, but true, that Armenian-Turkish relations today are - if we don't say non-existent - then completely unsatisfactory. I say unfortunately because today those relations could have been on a wholly different plane, had Turkey not adopted the wrong policy regarding Armenia in 1991-92. The fundamental obstacle for future Armenian-Turkish relations is our lack of trust in Turkey, as well as the fact that we are not hopeful that Turkey will become our reliable partner. Given the events of the beginning of the 20th century, Turkey had the opportunity, following Armenia's independence, to open a new page in the relations between our two peoples. However, by choosing today's policy - which is categorically anti-Armenian in its leaning - they further aggravated the distrust factor. Nevertheless, taking into consideration that we live together in the same region as neighbors, we are open to the possibility of improved relations, and we do take steps in that direction. Today, there is some mid-level official dialogue, there are contacts between representatives of non-governmental organizations, as well as businessmen. Despite the absence of bilateral political dialogue, we still think the process is positive. -

Q. Can we say that today, we are closer to establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey than 7 or 8 years ago?

A. It's hard to say whether we are closer or not. However, I would not say that Armenian-Turkish relations are worse than they were in the past due to our current policies. It is simply that the policy of the past - which avoided controversial issues in order to demonstrate good will, and make it possible for the Turkish leadership to display a more constructive approach toward Armenia and establish the normal foundations for the development of relations - was not fruitful. The advantage of our policy is that today, Turkey has an even greater interest and need to enter into a dialogue with Armenia; the international community, and the US in particular, is making even greater efforts to see that the two countries explore and resolve their common issues through dialogue. The other good thing is that by raising the issue of the Armenian Genocide publicly, broad-based discussions are taking place in Turkish society, which necessarily means that the Turkish public is becoming aware of Armenian perspectives and approaches. -

Q. What then is Armenia's reaction to Turkish Foreign Minister ‚em's proposal that an Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish meeting take place to discuss the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?

A. When that suggestion was made, representatives of Armenia's Foreign Ministry announced that Yerevan was negatively disposed toward that proposal. Some time later, in a meeting with Kahan Soyak, you stated that "Armenia considered the ‚em proposal with interest." Let me make two corrections. First, the proposal suggested a trilateral - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey-meeting not to address issues relating to the Karabakh conflict, but regional issues. And second, Armenia did not react negatively to the proposal. Rather, it was deemed impossible since there are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, since the latter continues to carry out a blockade of our country and has adopted clearly pro-Azerbaijani positions. We believe that these circumstances do not allow Turkey to serve as even a neutral mediator; thus any meeting would be ineffectual. -

Q. How do you explain the recent and frequent statements by US officials, that in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Turkey has no role to play as mediator? Do those statements carry a message for Turkey or Armenia?

A. Here, we should distinguish between Turkey's role of mediator in the negotiations process, and Turkey's possible indirect positive input toward the speedy resolution of the conflict. I've just elaborated on its role as mediator. For obvious reasons, they cannot have any positive input into the process. But until the issue is resolved, Turkey can - through its positive engagement, that is by removing the blockade, and by adopting a more even-handed approach regarding the conflict - expand Armenia's security options, decrease our concerns about certain issues, and thus make possible a compromise solution of the conflict. In other words, as a result of Turkish policy today, Armenia is forced to insure itself against the possible deterioration of Armenian-Turkish relations, thus placing greater demands on security. We are convinced that if over the last decade we had had good-neighborly relations with Turkey - independent of the existence of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict - today, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict would either have been resolved, or we would have far greater opportunities to find a quick solution. -

Q. In your opinion, doesn't the international campaign for Genocide recognition seek to exclude Turkey from the Nagorno Karabakh resolution process?

A. That is not our objective. Even though we are convinced that Genocide recognition and the Nagorno Karabakh resolution are on different planes, still, the two issues are fundamentally related as are the processes. For example, Turkey's recognition of the Armenian Genocide can have serious positive consequences on security guarantees for the people of Nagorno Karabakh. In any case, we think that that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is about the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination, and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide aims to reestablish historical justice, and this has not only pan-Armenian significance but also universal.

Q. Is it possible that Turkey's extreme emotional response to the fact of international recognition of the Genocide may have serious consequences for Armenia?

A. It is possible there may be certain additional problems, but not serious consequences. Today, the Turkish blockade has already ceased to be effective in terms of adversely affecting Armenia's economy. During these ten years, Armenia has accommodated itself to the conditions created by the blockade. I believe that the Turkish threats against us would have been more effective if borders had been open during these last eight years. The potential closing of open borders would have given us greater pause than the non-opening of already closed borders. -

Q. What are the chances that the US House of Representatives will return to the matter of Genocide recognition, and what results might be expected?

A. I'm certain that this year, too, the Armenian community will bring that issue to the Congress. It's difficult to predict the results. In the final analysis, the decision of the French Senate will serve as a positive example to the US Congress and other countries' parliaments. The lesson to be learned there is that Turkish hysteria lasted all of two weeks. And today, Turkey is requesting French support in dealing with the international financial organizations in order to come out of its economic crisis. After all, Turkey is far more dependent on the G-7 countries, than any one of them is on Turkey. -

Q. Don't you think that Armenian public opinion is not ready for normal relations with Turkey, and that this can be a serious obstacle that official Yerevan is overlooking?

A. First let me say that we view with great seriousness our public opinion, not just regarding Turkey but all of our foreign policy. As for our relations with Turkey, I believe that a majority of our population desires normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, so long as that does not come at Nagorno Karabakh's expense, or at the cost of defending our historic and current rights.

Q. Today, Turkey is in a serious economic crisis. Might that circumstance lead it to somewhat modify its regional policies? And, is it possible that Turkey's crisis may affect the economies of the region?

A. Unfortunately, Turkey's regional policy today is grandiose and pretentious. That is rooted in their search to establish their identity and other issues. Today, Turkey has serious problems with most of its immediate neighbors. This policy was clearly evident in Turkey's reaction when France and other countries' parliaments began looking into the matter of Genocide recognition. And because such behavior has deep roots, we don't believe that today's crisis will lead to a more unassuming approach in their regional policy. Especially since the cause of this economic crisis is political, and at its base is the battle between those who wish to leave behind such traditions and those who wish to continue them. In any case, that economic crisis can affect only those countries which have serious economic ties to Turkey, and especially if they have large quantities of imports or exports. -

Q. Notwithstanding the recent statement of the Georgian Foreign Minister made while he was in Armenia recently, military and political cooperation between Ankara and Tbilisi is growing. Especially taking into account the announcement already made that the Marneuli military airport is being used by Turkish planes. In the absence of Armenian-Turkish relations, does such Georgian-Turkish cooperation potentially become destabilizing?

A. We have frequently said that Turkish-Georgian military cooperation concerns us and, we believe, can fundamentally disrupt the regional equilibrium. Armenian-Georgian relations are the link which serves as the fundamental guarantor of the region's, albeit fragile, stability, and which does not allow the establishment of divisive lines in the region. That equilibrium may be disrupted if the Georgian-Turkish military cooperation deepens, and if Georgia gradually and even unnoticeably becomes more and more dependent on Turkey, and perhaps unknowingly, is pulled into the formation of a Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis, thus becoming involved in the Turkish and Azerbaijani policy to isolate Armenia.