Vahan Hovhannisian:
Good evening; We weren't able to arrange a debate today, but the list of topics to be covered is quite clear, and I don't think our conversation will suffer as a result.

Mr. Oskanian, during these 20-25 days, Armenia's foreign relations have not occupied a significant place in this campaign. There are many possible explanations: People aren't really interested in the subject, the candidates don't find it particularly important and don't want to go deep into it, or those who oppose today's foreign policies are of the past, they are represented by the officials of the former administration, rather than today's opposition. Nevertheless, there is clear criticism aimed at you on one issue: relating to the term complementarity. I'm not sure all the candidates understand what that means, but there is a lot of play around that term, a lot of talk that over these 5 years the policy of complementarity has not produced the desired results, it's failed, and so on and so on. Before responding about whether the policy has succeeded or failed, please explain one more time the meaning of complementarity and then, the effect of that policy over these 5 years.

FM Vartan Oskanian: No Vahan, I won't try to explain complementarity, but I want to talk about its results. And I'm not surprised that most of the criticism is aimed at that policy, because that's the opposition's sore spot. They know very well that not only have we not failed with complementarity, on the contrary, that it is our success. That's not our assessment, but others' conclusion, as well. Recently, there was a significant piece in a Georgian paper by an authoritative writer, assessing the foreign policies of the three Caucasus countries, and Armenia was put in the top spot. The writer based his analysis on our policy of complementarity. Also, the well-known, respected Economist weekly newspaper had published an article where among Armenia's list of friends, they had listed US, Russia, Iran. And they too, expressed surprise at how Armenia could succeed in classing such disparate countries among its friends and conducting optimal and successful relations with them. Especially when Georgia or Azerbaijan include either one or the other on their list of friends. And don't forget that our neighbors, too, four years later, are also adopting our same policy. Azerbaijan has already been trying over these last few years to implement the policy of complementarity. Recently, Georgia, too, announced at the presidential level, its intention to pursue complementarity. So, on the contrary, let me say that complementarity is one of the most successful pillars around which our foreign policy is constructed, one of the most important and a retreat from that policy can have great negative effects for us.

Q. Mr. Oskanian, I can partially agree if for no other reason than that Mr. Kocharian's foreign policy agenda is the object of least cricisim in these elections. Other spheres receive greater criticism. But there is a concern, which I've run across most frequently among the theoreticians of the former administration, that Armenia is becoming more isolated. For example, that the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is an example of the failure of Armenia's foreign policy. Last week, presidential candidate Artashes Geghamian, sounded a similar accusation. 

A: If the opposition uses the fact that Baku-Ceyhan does not transverse Armenia as evidence of Armenia's isolation, that is itself proof that Armenia has not been pushed toward isolation. In effect, they can find no other argument and they are using Baku-Ceyhan. Let me say this: if there is anyone who believes that under the conditions created today around Karabagh, Azerbaijan would allow its own oil to transverse Armenia, then forgive me, but those people are na•ve. Here, we can conclude one of two things. That if those people were in places of authority, then they would be prepared to trade Karabagh against a gas or oil pipeline, because under today's conditions, there is no other way of getting a pipeline to go through Armenia. Or, those people really are quite far from foreign affairs and are trying to exploit this issue. Let me propose a parallel. To claim that Baku-Ceyhan pipeline's not going through Armenia is proof of the failure of Armenia's foreign policy is the same as saying that for example, the Lincy Foundation's $150 million investment in Armenia is the result of the failure of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

Q. That's an interesting comparison, Mr. Oskanian. In attempting to summarize the Baku-Ceyhan issue, I'd like to just add one thing. The criticism arises from differing viewpoints. For me, the position of the former administration is understandable in its entirety. That is, if we had made certain concessions in the Nagorno Karabagh issue, then we would have had the opportunity for having an oil pipeline transitting Armenia. It is less understandable, or generally not undertandable then, to talk about Baku-Ceyhan at all if concessions are unacceptable. But that's not the problem. There is rivalry in this region. Through military rivalry, we passed through the war stage and entered the stage of economic rivalry. In that area, Azerbaijan has obvious positional advantage thanks to its rich natural resources. Georgia is located at a convenient transportation and communication crossing. What is Armenia's playing card? In President Kocharian's election platform, there is an emphasis on Armenia becoming the region's most organized state. Two questions about this: What does Ղthe region's most organized state' mean? What are the criteria for organizedness, and finally, what does that give us in terms of regional competitiveness? Will that compensate for Azerbaijan's natural resources or Georgia's communication advantages or is this simply a way of consoling ourselves?

A. I don't think this is simply consolation. There are indications of that today. The foundations have been put down during these five years. It's true that over time, competition in the region is going to get tougher. When the gas and oil pipelines are constructed and the economies begin to take off, that competition will increase. But during these five years, under the toughest conditions, we have been able to demonstrate that we are able to be the leader in this region. Now, we must build on this. In fact, President Kocharian's choice of that word is the distillation of a vision for the next five years and beyond: to become the most organized state in this region. Why? For the reasons you cited. Today, our resources really are only human resources. They are our strong statehood, our domestic stability, our free market economy and the liberal investment climate. These must be transformed into those resources on which we build our state, our economy. Without these we can not compete with our neighbors who have natural resources and the best conditions for transit. Today, according to international organizations, Armenia is in first place. All the numbers indicate this. And if in these five years, we have been able to be in a leading position, under the existing conditions, then Kocharian's slogan that we must become the region's most organized and progressive country takes on new meaning and reason. It give us hope that over these next fives years, on this footing, we can truly build our state and make it the leading state in the region. Based on what we have been able to do in these past five years, I have no doubt that we can.

Q. So, we must compensate for Azerbaijan's and Georgia's advantages or weak points with dynamism and energy?

A. And with a pro-active approach, with our intellectual abilities, our people's ability to think, and with the conduct of our foreign policy. As you said in your introduction, Vahan, unfortunately today in this campaign, foreign policy is not a topic of discussion. But we forget that the internal and external are so interconnected that without the right foreign policy we can not have domestic successes either. Today, a lot depends on the outside world. It's enough just to look at our geography, to see what kind of neighborhood we live in and what kind of relations we have with our neighbors, to understand what kinds of processes are ongoing regionally and globally and how they will affect Armenia and the region. All this makes it clear that our foreign policy must guarantee our internal stability and economic development.

Q. Mr. Oskanian, I want to try to understand the basis for your optimism. This is February 2003. In the 1990s when independence was being established, the reigning assumption was that Armenia would turn into a regional financial center, a transit intersection, a tourism center, etc. To some extent these were illusory dreams, and the reality was much starker. It became clear that those dreams were much harder to achieve. Ten years later, what is it that inspires you to optimistically say that in any case, Armenia can turn as you have said, into the regional IT center, the financial services center, active tourism center, etc. In these 10 years, has something changed, do you have some solid reasons for so confidently repeating these dreams, or are they the same kind of statements as we'd heard 10 years ago?

A. I don't agree that in 1991 those ideas were illusory dreams. What might have been illusory was the time frame for achieving them. In other words, all that we wanted was not possible in a few years, or even in 10 years. But, I don't doubt that finally, we will be able to achieve those dreams. And the basis for my optimism is today's situation, especially the path that we've traveled these last five years. And, the last 10 years, as well. I don't want to leave the impression that whatever has happened since 1991 is not good, and that good things were limited to the last five years. No, these 10-11 years are our people's history. If we hadn't had those hard days, we wouldn't have these good days. We needed to pass through that period. It's true, there were mistakes. We have learned from those mistakes and are trying to correct them. But today's situation indeed fills me with optimism. Let me put it this way, so I'm not reproached: whether you want to consider the last 5 years or the last 11 years, our situation today, the status quo, does inspire optimism. Do we have political stability? We do. Is Nagorno Karabagh in firm hands today? It is. Is or was our territorial integrity threatened? No. Do we have economic growth? Yes. Have we stopped or slowed down the flow of emigration? Yes. Is Armenia's image in the region ranked high? Yes. Are we participants in global processes? Yes. Do we play a pro-active role in international organizations? Yes. In recent years, have we become a member of the Council of Europe as evidence of the political significance of our legal reforms? Have we become a member of the World Trade Organization, as evidence of the significance of our economic reforms? Yes and yes.

Doesn't all this inspire you, me, our people to rely on our own strengths, to stay on the path that we've embarked on, to continue, and bring those processes into which we've become integrated to their natural end? If we look at those so-called illusions of 1991, if they are put into their real time context, then they're not such illusions after all, and our people and our state are indeed worthy of all that we dreamed in 1991.

Q. By illusion, I didn't mean anything negative. In 1991, I too, lived with those illusions or desires, whatever we want to call them. There truly are bases for optimism today, but we'll get back to that a little bit later. Let me ask a question about the Lincy Foundation. You spoke of them when responding to the Baku-Ceyhan question. Today, that is a campaign topic. And the opposition is a bit put off when talking about Lincy, for the following simple reason. They ask why is President Kocharian taking credit for the consequences of the Lincy Foundation's activities. One of the candidates, I think it was Stepan Demirchian in Gyumri, said, ՁWhoever was [president] those funds would have come, the earthquake zone would have been rebuilt. That shouldn't be viewed within the realm of the incumbent president.ձ You as someone who was actively involved from the beginning of those negotiations Հ I know you were personally in touch with Kirk Kerkorian Հ what can you say about this?

A. You know, I'd like to respond to that kind of thinking, not just in the Lincy context, but generally, because really there does appear to be the thinking that all of this, whatever has happened, was going to happen anyway. If we hadn't attempted to join the Council of Europe, they would have made us members, if we hadn't wanted to enter the World Trade Organization, they would have made us members anyway. But friends, let's look around us, at our neighbors, at those other Soviet republics which became independent at the same time as we did -- they aren't members of these organizations. This kind of mentality is very dangerous because it turns people into do-nothings. As a result, they are unable to demonstrate creative thinking about our internal and foreign policies, and that, today, can present us with serious dangers.
Regarding Lincy, I have the moral right I think to speak at length about this, since I have been directly involved. At the recommendation of the President of the Republic, in 1998, immediately after the elections, one of the President's first assignments to me, was to go see Kirk Kerkorian, meet with him, talk to him, present our plans, invite him to Armenia and enlist his involvement.

Q. Forgive me for interrupting, but I wanted to point out something. If I'm not mistaken, prior to President Kocharian's election, in 1993-94, Mr. Kerkorian contributed US $14 million for the Winter Fuel project. In other words, he didn't just start becoming involved in 1998, and this serves as basisլ

A. Of course. Kirk Kerkorian also made his valuable contribution immediately after the earthquake, he assisted Armenia by establishing the airlift. All this happened with Kerkorian's resources. But there is a fundamental, essential difference here. Kirk Kerkorian's participation in Armenia's economic life before 1998 had to do with those matters which effected people's lives, matters of survival. At those critical times, as an Armenian, Mr. Kerkorian participated by providing invaluable humanitarian assistance. But it was a different thing entirely, when President Kocharian thought that it is time to include Kirk Kerkorian in Armenia's development issues, the creation, construction and repair of infrastructure. That is why he asked that I go meet with Kerkorian and present him with certain plans. That is most important. Some people assume that the Lincy Foundation or Kirk Kerkorian decided how that money should be disbursed, or determined that he had a certain amount of money to give. Actually, it happened as a result of specific proposals. I can imagine that some other president might have received $50 or $100 million and spent it on other areas entirely. Perhaps spent it on small and medium size business development, as had been done for a while. But the President was able to determine which are the strategically most significant issues for us. The first among those was the reconstruction of the earthquake zone. Second was road construction so that under the continuing blockade, we would be able to secure our north-south connection. The third was culture. That too is strategically significant today as a factor in changing our people's moral-psychological state. And so it was these problems which were put before Lincy, at the President's suggestion. The corresponding amounts were allocated, and the projects were underway. Therefore, I absolutely do not accept that these projects would have happened anyway regardless of who was in office, that those funds would have come anyway and would have been spent for those purposes.

Let me give you another example along these same lines. Since 1991, we have received from US $80 to $90 million each year in assistance from the US government. Until 1998-99, these funds were spent on wheat, or oil or other consumable goods which were sent here, and people ate, or burnt or otherwise consumed this assistance and it was gone. It was only in 1998 that President Kocharian decided to see if it would not be possible to use some of those funds toward infrastructure problems and toward Armenia's development needs. But someone had to think of that, right, for it to be proposed? If we hadn't done that in the previous seven years, why assume that it would necessarily have been that way in the next five? And it was only after Kocharian's suggestion that we use $20 million of US assistance for constructing residences in the earthquake zone, that the wonderful and effective certificate program came into being which has produced exceptional results Հ those are Kocharian's ideas. And this would not necessarily have been the case if someone else were president. I just returned from the US a few days ago, and today, we have identified a new objective. As the Armenian assistance package is being discussed, we have determined to ask for special, earmarked funds for infrastructure solutions. We have also proposed to expand the $20 million certificate program to cover refugees, even as we continue to find complete solutions to the issue of living spaces within the earthquake zone. And there are many other such goals.

Q. Mr. Oskanian if we combine the optimism which you expressed a bit earlier, and the passionate way in which you so explicitly explained the Kirk Kerkorian Lincy Foundation matter, do we have reason to be hopeful?

A. Vahan, if I weren't an optimist, I wouldn't have stayed in this job for a minute. If I didn't dream about the future, again, I wouldn't stay in this job. Each of us has his own dreams, right? If we don't dream, then Հ and this probably sounds quite philosophical Հ we probably don't exist. I dream. When I walk the streets of Yerevan, these destroyed streets, I imagine that these streets are not going to stay this way, that eventually, they are going to be rebuilt. When I go out of the city, I dream of Armenia's villages of the future. We must each live with hope. And today, we have reason to be hopeful. This isn't 1992-93 or 1996 when we were trying to convince the people that all will be well. I call on our people to be optimistic, go vote, vote for the candidate of your choice, but look at matters objectively, look at what has been happening in this country over the last five years.
We have reason to be confident, we must continue to go forward, we can't afford to go back, or to go down an unknown road. I've said this many times, and I want to repeat this today. Today our people are faced with the following choice: to continue as we have been, or to choose an unfamiliar path. 

Q. Mr. Oskanian, you inspire as you talk. I say that sincerely, but I'd like to continue with more objective issues. When we've exhausted them, we'll return to this theme. Let's go back to 1996. After the 1996 elections came Lisbon and we found ourselves in a difficult position. And even supporters of the former president, I remember for example David Shahnazarian specificallly, said that our defeat in Lisbon or the situation created at the Lisbon OSCE Summit regarding Karabagh was in some way the consequence of the defective process of the presidential elections. In other words, the internal political situation, the internal tension, fundamentally, substantially affected our foreign policy positions. Now it's 2003 and there is a campaign on. Do you have any worries that this election process can effect our foreign policy positions, and second, what bases do you have to be optimistic that this campaign and these elections can strengthen our hand in conducting foreign policy? Are they really interrelated, or is that something we say for internal consumption and the world really isn't so interested in what goes on here and how the elections go?

A. Vahan, that linkage truly exists and that concerns me greatly. Let me explain. First, let me say the obvious: the more free, fair and transparent our elections, the greater will be our prestige in international circles and the stronger the president's position. There is no doubt about this. And truly, we must do everything in order to have such fair elections, and not just so that we can be one step ahead of the last elections, but ten steps ahead. We must really try to conduct these elections at an ideal level. I know we won't reach the ideal, but we must strive for that. Our people's interests require that. And as foreign minister, let me say that the President, the administration, too, want and need for there to be free, fair, transparent elections. Let me say very honestly that today we have the right conditions for that to happen. The president's standing today is quite good. We've never had such a situation so close to the elections, when an incumbent president has put forth his candidacy and finds himself in such a good position, both in the surveys and generally in people's attitudes. And we see this everyday, on television. This is also demonstrated by the polls which are conducted quite freely and fairly, and whose answers we see made public even in the opposition papers. There is no doubt that the president's position is quite good, and the president should be, and is, the most interested in seeing that we hold free, fair and transparent elections.

I see a danger here, Vahan, which concerns me greatly. The opposition is already claiming, from now, that if Kocharian wins that means we did not have fair elections, that means elections were fraudulent. To make that kind of pre-judgement and to prepare the ground, after a Kocharian victory, to question its legitimacy -- that doesn't serve anyone's interests. That simply makes us vulnerable. I would understand all this if the president's standing was very weak, and today he had maybe 10 or 15 % support. But when the president's support is consistently around 50%, and when his closest challenger is just around 20%, and still such prejudicial charges are being floated and the ground is being prepared for future exploitation, this really worries me as foreign minister, and as a man who is worried about our people's our state's prestige. Such abuse would seriously weaken us and I believe we should not allow that to happen.

That is why we must do everything we can to assure the transparency of the elections. But this is isn't the only problem Vahan, it's just the one which affects us in the outside world.

Q. Here, you are saying you have reason to be optimistic that if indeed the president is elected with a strong/large mandate, then our position is strengthened in the foreign relations sphere. But at the same time, you are uncomfortable that if the mandate is continually questioned by the opposition, that too will fundamentally effect your work in the outside world.

A. Yes, because although it's true that the outside world will finally have its own evidence by which to judge, still, all this noise will reach the foreign observers, will affect public opinion, and our enemies will utilize that. That is the issue here. Today, our enemies attempt to use every detail against Armenia in international forums. We saw how the terrorism issue was utilized. Many other bits of information today are used and misused by Turkey and Azerbaijan. That is why I am concerned. I'm also distressed in a strictly domestic context with a series of other abuses in this election period which concern our national unity, our people's future. One of those is the exploitation of the October 27 events. Look, October 27 wasn't a tragedy for just a few families. It was the Armenian people's tragedy. In that event, our whole society is guilty, we are guilty. The society, the conditions that had been created in the years preceding those events, the fundamental Ձaccompliceձ was that environment. I'm not afraid to repeat this thought because I'm deeply convinced about this. We are all accomplices, and today, during this election period, we are living a very critical period, our people are facing serious choices, and that tragedy is being exploited, and efforts are being made to associate the events with the president, that is absolutely unacceptable.

Q. Mr. Oskanian, let's not focus.

A: I'm not focusing. But this is what I have to say to our people, that if there is a link between President Kocharian and the events of October 27, that linkage should be that the President was able, after those horrible events, to keep the country calm, to secure internal stability, and in the shortest possible time, to bring the country out of that situation. That is what the connection should be. The second abuse, which is absolutely unacceptable is the issue of Meghri. Meghri is a matter of national security, of territorial integrity. To exploit that and to say that this administration was going to hand over Meghri is unacceptable. I've been on the front lines of that issue and I've participated in the whole process. I can say the following: that perhaps if there had not been Kocharian, that perhaps Meghri would have been threatened, because -- and I'm not saying anything new here, we said this at the time -- yes, there was such a suggestion by a third country, and such a proposal had made it to the table. If it had not been for Kocharian's strong position, his firm position and his persistence, perhaps Meghri would truly have been in danger. Here, too, this issue can only be linked positively with Kocharian, be seen in a positive context, because it is thanks to his policies that that proposal only had a life of a few hours, altogether. The third -- and with this I'll complete the list of abuses -- is exploiting the issue of Karabakh vs. Armenia, the Karabakhtsi. That is absolutely unacceptable because after February 19, after these elections are over, we must all continue to live together on this land that is Armenia and Karabakh. 

Q. If we're honest, those games are being played less this time around than they were in 1998. If we are to be objective, they have decreased.

A. God willing. But in the press, nevertheless, those charges continue to be heard, and in this respect, I just have this to say: If today, there is just one person in Armenia who truly, in his heart and mind -- not for the purposes of political expediency but in his heart and mind -- truly believes that a Karabakhtsi is not a Hayastantsi, then I feel sorry for that person. That's all I can say. In our public life, that subject should never be exploited.

Q. Mr. Oskanian, the elections make for a tense environment. Many candidates are attempting to cling to the sorest, sharpest, most troublesome issues. Let's assume this is typical of the election disease, and let's not make a tragedy of the situation, hoping that after the elections, all the exploitation and abuse will die down. I want to return to the issue of a strong Kocharian mandate giving him greater opportunity to be stronger in the Karabagh issue, and creating a favorable environment for resolving this issue. We frequently hear that never before has our approach to the Karabakh issue been so acceptable to the international community as today. It is obvious that the cautionary notes of 1998 were cast aside by life itself Հ that the party of peace would be replaced by the party of war Հ that didn't happen. There is no party of war; there is no war. But is there the basis to assure us that in the next five years there really will be peace, that our acceptable approaches will be transformed into documents? Do you see this in the next five years, because after all this is the fundamental issue? The elections have pushed aside this issue in favor of social, economic, and some political pushing and pulling, but fundamentally the issue of Karabakh's status remains.

A: You have raised several questions here. The first is that a strong mandate for Kocharian is important and essential to resolve a whole series of other issues, among them to more effectively tackle the Karabakh issue and reach our objective. No one should doubt that Karabakh is indeed a fundamental issue. As for the substance of the Karabakh issue, you know, we have undergone an interesting evolutionary process over these 10 years, quite interesting. I don't want to refer to the pre-Lisbon stage. The situation then was quite fluid, we were at war. Then we were engaged in negotiations, but there really were no concrete proposals on the table. It was after Lisbon that specific proposals were made regarding Karabakh's status. And it is from that point that I want to describe the evolution so that our people see what a distance we've traveled. It's true that there is no guarantee that today's (what for us are positive) tendencies will continue. Of course we must do everything we can to proceed in that way and reach the final results, but today the world is so fluid, there can be so many unexpected developments, that everything can suddenly change. Still, as of today, the evolution has been very positive for us. In Lisbon, it was said that the issue of Nagorno Karabagh can only be resolved within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Today, we've been able to get beyond that thinking, that approach. The international community's disposition toward the Nagorno Karabagh issue today is fundamentally different from what it was at Lisbon. We still hear undesirable pronouncements such as the recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but during these five years we have succeeded in affecting a change in thinking, by putting our focus on the legal bases of the Nagorno Karabagh issue, going back to 1918-20, citing the League of Nations rejection of Azerbaijan's application based exactly on the fact the Azerbaijan had no control over Karabakh.

Q. Are there the prospects, in future years, of reinforcing that thinking?

A. Of course. Today we no longer hear any predetermining, preordained positions on how to resolve the Nagorno Karabagh issue. If they used to say that the issue must be resolved within Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, then today they say the issue must be resolved through negotiations, with the consent of the sides. And this is a fundamental change in the thinking of the international community. Unfortunately, given our agreement with the Minsk Group co-chairs, today we can not speak publicly about the Key West documents, but that would have been resounding evidence of the kind of formulation that the Nagorno Karabagh issue enjoys today. I can't speak openly about that, but when you asked earlier whether it would be possible to turn the beneficial approaches into some sort of document, I can tell you that those documents exist, what remains is for us, after the elections, and after Azerbaijan's own elections, to continue the negotiations on that basis, and I'm convinced that in the next five years we will be able to register serious progress in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.

Q. Let me note something and then we can move on. It is essential that these elections produce a mandate that is transparent, strong, acceptable. There is no doubt about that. But there is a broader circle of questions, called globalization. This is another topic that has not been on the list of issues discussed during this campaign, but it's something about which you've frequently expressed yourself. Just as globalization is a challenge, it is also a series of opportunities which can be used to Armenia's advantage. Personally, my favorite point in Kocharian's election program is the utilization of the advantages of globalization, and you, in a way, represent the globalization wing of Kocharian's team. Mr. Oskanian, let me ask you a very sincere question. In Armenia, there are two directions, two elites. One is the group around President Kocharian which strives for the standards of globalization, of contemporary civilization. But, there is also the shall we say more traditional, more rough and tough elite, which also has its place, and a rather strong place at that. Do you feel a serious tension or pull between these two or not? Second, wouldn't that second elite resist the standards, advantages, challenges of globalization? We're not talking about the opposition here, we're talking about the power base in this administration, where there is both this side and that side. You clearly represent this side. Which side will win out?

A. Let me start from the end and say that there truly is that contradiction. I can also share a few examples. But let me categorically say that finally, the positive will win out. In other words, we can't lag behind, we must be part of the international flow, and go the path of globalization. Let me just give you a small idea of how necessary and helpful globalization is for Armenia. It's true that there can be negative consequences as well, but the negative will win out only if we isolate ourselves and not attempt to join in. That's when the consequences can really be bad. But for a moment let's think how all this can lead and already has lead to such possibilities. For a small country like Armenia in such a geographic position -- if we can use satellites for example, so that our scientists can benefit from globalization and receive orders via the internet from the US, UK France or India, and fulfill them from Armenia, independent of Turkey's or Azerbaijan's blockade, and send their order to India, China, the US, UK or France, that is the obvious proof of an opportunity of which Armenia can avail itself. I spoke about a dream, but this is not a dream. Today, we are on this path. I want for our students in the villages of Meghri to be able to enter the library of Congress and use their books, to enter various websites and enhance their knowledge, but we, as a state, must create the foundations for our future generations. In our schools, we must head toward total computerization, toward stressing language acquisition. All this brings to the fore our national character, as well. When you begin to compete with the international, then you are making your own inert national attributes active. Those who say we are a small nation, and therefore, if we go with that global flow we will lose that which is ours, are so very wrong. Actually, the national becomes even more stressed. We will be able to find a positive synthesis between the national and the best of the international. If a people that has gone through fire in its 3000-year history today is afraid of the waves of globalization, that means we have lost a great deal. But I'm convinced that this represents no threat to us, and we must go down this path. As to whether our government officials today have the vision to turn these issues into priorities for us, well, yes and no. And that's natural. Today, there are people from two different generations represented in government. There are those who are for, and those who are against, these processes. Of course we can all see this, and see that it gives rise to complications. For example, when our ministry wanted to make visas available electronically, we faced obstacles. People asked what is that, how will that effect national security, what does it mean, what about revenues. There were a thousand questions. But we were able to do it. Today, Armenia, after Australia, is the second country in the world to provide electronic visas. And that means that Armenia is absolutely at the forefront in that sphere.

Q. The fact that there is such a forward looking direction and that it is expressed not just in Kocharian's program, but also in his speeches, and to some extent in his policies, that is clear. But don't you see the danger in running a campaign whose slogan is continuity, and where the idea of modernization, of a fresh, young, healthy, vibrant team focused on the standards of globalization, is weakly expressed? But I also understand that the election doesn't depend on those who back globalization. 

A. We should probably talk about issues and not about people. Of course personnel issues means we are talking about people. It is true that Kocharian's campaign platform assumes that there will be serious personnel changes. The second five years, for Kocharian, will be an entirely new period. His hands will be much freer to choose and work with the team of his choice. Let's not forget that Kocharian's presidential mandate was weakened just one year after the elections, with the events of October 27, and Kocharian was forced to take steps that he would never have taken had those events not happened. A lot was forced on Kocharian, both in terms of politics and personnel. If Kocharian receives a new mandate from the people, in the next five years, I'm convinced that his vision will be implemented much more effectively. As his campaign material explains, there will be much broader programs and they will be carried out by a team that actually believes in that direction, is capable of and willing to realize those changes. I'm convinced of this. Who will these people be? We'll see after the elections, but that there will be change, I have no doubt.

Q. Let's try to summarize our conversation. What is the vision for the next 5-10 years?

A. I think I've referred to this on and off during our conversation. Let me say again that I believe the last five years actually inspire great hope for the next five. I've been following the elections closely and I see that various candidates question certain issues. Frequently, people will say that yes, we believe that there has been 13-14% economic growth, but we haven't felt that. I know that a majority of our people hasn't felt that growth. Over time, that difference will be felt. But the question is time: Will they feel it in three years, or 13 years or 23 years? The greater the rate of growth, the more quickly results will be felt. Compared to the Soviet period, our standard of living fell. Then, in 1991, we began to slowly come back up. If by 1995, 96, 97, we were able to rise up a certain amount, in the last five years that rise was faster. 

Q. If we're honest, no one really disputes that there is economic growth. 

A. Look, for someone sitting in a village, or in the center of Yerevan, who hasn't felt the benefit of that growth, that person must understand that there must be such growth over the long-term. We must be able to assure that growth over the next five years.

Q. Don't you feel that there is greater criticism that a clear vision for the future is not expressed? There has been economic growth, the details of that growth have been publicized. The opposition is weak there. Still, in the way that vision has been presented, there is still a problem in inspiring optimism for the future.

A. If all that has not been presented well, that has been our fault. But I'll say it again, these five years can indeed inspire us to be optimistic. In five years, when we have the chance to sit and talk about all this, Armenia, in 2008, will be at a completely different level. We will be ready to knock on the EU's door to begin membership negotiations, if we are able to maintain this pace. Today our problem, the choice facing our people is this: to go down the unknown path, or to follow and continue down the familiar road, with a clear indication of where we are heading. In terms of standard of living, I don't doubt that a majority of our people will begin to feel this economic growth in their pockets. I am convinced that the economic growth will also be coupled with the fight against corruption. We must also struggle against the clan system, we must work towards removing the shadow economy, tax collection must be simultaneous more active and non-discriminatory. There are still many many problems. I hope I have not left the impression that there are no problems to solve in the next five years. But those problems can be solved if we at the same time maintain the progress that we have registered in these five years. Without raising the salary of the policeman on the street, it is not possible to expect that he won't be taking money on the side. Those two problems must be solved together. And in the second five years, when Kocharian has the people's mandate, and has no reelection concerns, he can take more practical steps, make decisions or take actions which may not be to the liking of certain people, but be positive and beneficial to the masses. And I'm certain that is what these five years will be: years of justice, years of fighting corruption and the other negative phenomena, necessarily coupled with economic growth, creation of jobs, maintaining low inflationary rates, and active foreign relations in order to be able to secure our internal, as well as regional stability. Without these, we will not be able to accomplish all that we've spoken about.

Q. Thank you for an interesting and sincere conversation, and your optimistic and candid words.

A. Thank you.