By Rouben Shugarian,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Armenias globalization started right after she proclaimed her independence, when the countryՉs secessionist aspirations and ambitions had been satisfied. Alongside with the Baltic countries, Armenia was in the front-line of the break-away movement from the USSR. The Soviet Empire was by itself a result and a product of a somewhat weird, mal-formed globalization process, which was designed, prepared and carried out at the dawn of the XX century. Therefore, the fight for independence in the former Soviet republics, Armenia included, was simultaneously an anti-globalization movement.

But as soon as the important national goals were reached, and the newly-independent states were internationally recognized, the policy pendulum in the FSU countries gradually and at times abruptly tilted towards globalization. ArmeniaՉs active and creative engagement in various integration processes such as the establishment of the CIS, and, before that, the 9+1 format, as well as her participation as a founding member in the BSEC clearly indicate that this country plans to build a future, based upon phased globalization strategy.

What is phased globalization, and how is it consciously and sub-consciously perceived by Armenian society at large, and how is it translated into the countryՉs foreign policy agenda? First and foremost, it is the political transfiguration of what was once called the Trans- Caucasus into the South Caucasus. The paradox of the situation is that if the region were renamed into the Caucasus without any other geographical indicator, while its landscape would have been widened, its geopolitical semantics would have been narrowed and diminished to a predominantly Russian context. So this is the case when less is more, or when a smaller territory opens the doors and windows for bigger globalization. Today in addition to the Russian connection, the South Caucasus region has a clear-cut Iranian link, a Turkish dimension, as well as supra-regional links to the US, EU and China. This is the first phase of globalization for Armenia, which is reflected in her foreign policy agenda.

The second globalization phase is the process of joint integration of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into the European architecture. This phase is currently under way, because the three countries have already become members of the OSCE and Council of Europe. PFP, PARP and the rest are auxiliary implements to further promote the process of integration. Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood initiatives in which the South Caucasus countries are today envisaged only as would-be participants, are the bridge to eventually connect it to the EU.

The third globalization phase for the South Caucasus could be formally started upon the completion of the European integration. Informally it goes parallel to the second phase, for it is nothing but a joint search for a renewed European identity, based upon the social, political and cultural riches of the past and shared not only by and between France and Germany or England and Spain, but by Poland and Armenia or Georgia or Lithuania. Would this new European identity be eventually linked, or further globalized towards the Western hemisphere, is a question to be answered in future. It is here that globalization seems to be a trap, though not for Armenia, because it is չsafelyՊ landlocked, but for todayՉs Europe. It might lose its identity, old or the renewed one, somewhere in between Burger King, the European Champions Soccer League and the Constitutional patriotism (new German parliamentary term).

In the present day, it is quite customary and even popular to proudly state at various globalization seminars and forums that each country, each EU nation should sacrifice its national identity for the common cause, the immaculate conception of some faceless and personality-less, jointly shared new European identity, resting upon common economic interest and a so-called enlightened egoism (Dietrich SperlingՉs term). It is imperatively and authoritatively advised that the past should simply fade into memory, and the future should be based upon new philosophy not burdened by the indigestion-causing leftovers of the last century, (the most overzealous would perhaps suggest to erase the last millennium). However, Europe without the past is valueless, it turns into a cultural history museum, or a big nursing home, not only with assisted living, but also with assisted thinking. This kind of europization versus globalization, another popular terminology today, is a great self-deception. The geopolitical offspring of this new mind-set will not be a Europe of disappearing borders, but a Europe of disappearing identities.

The Old World is in need of new blood and flesh, new ideas and even new problems. Paradoxical as it sounds, but it also needs our vices and our headaches, accumulated during the Soviet times and before, which will secure it against the dangers of petrified comfort, as well as against the idea of distilled welfare and pasteurized happiness.

Globalization or euoropization, whatever it is called, should be a conscious process, where its subjects (not objects) must retain their national identity and personality, adding them to, but not dissolving them in the wider regional context.

We described ArmeniaՉs post independence path as a phased globalization process. This was done in the framework of the South Caucasus region and its further integration into Europe. Yet there is another angle, from which it is worth to observe ArmeniaՉs globalization prospects.

First, it would be prudent to once again resort to the paradoxical formula of post-Soviet globalization, -less is more. As it was stated above, the geographically bigger Caucasus region is geo-politically smaller than its own Southern part. In her turn, from the point of view of potential globalization, Armenia has more room to expand than the South Caucasus.

ArmeniaՉs globalization as a nation and as a state is directly related to the question of her national idiosyncrasy, as well as the foreign policy orientation. As a nation residing not only in Armenia proper, but spread and scattered around the globe (over 90 countries), it goes through a two-fold globalization process. In fact, two thirds of the Armenian people live outside their homeland. Moreover, it is noteworthy, that some Armenian communities and individuals went and still go through double and even triple emigration campaigns. This leads to the mechanical addition of several ethnic identities, which eventually are found to be in frequent discord with each other. However Armenian Diaspora has always been a powerful vehicle not only for self-integration into the international community, but also an effective globalization means for Armenia proper, which cannot be found in the rest of the South Caucasus.

Before independence, Armenians emigrating from the Middle East to the US had to reconcile three identities, the two that had been exported from the overseas and the new American one. The result of this individual globalization was ambivalent. Those Armenians, who in their public life tried to focus only on national issues, - cultural, religious, educational and political, succeeded to preserve their original ethnic identity, but were not fully and harmoniously integrated into the new society. Those Armenians who belonged to the second and third generation living in Europe or the US, dissolved their ethnic identity in the socio-cultural context of the countries they resided in. There was almost no golden middle left between those two polar Diaspora groups, except for the lobbying organizations, who had to keep the balance inside their two-fold or even three-fold identity to be able to perform their every day duties.

After Armenia regained independence and statehood, the two Armenian community categories made steps to approach each other and the homeland to reconcile their identities. The group that preferred to go through individual globalization in Diaspora, when Armenia was still a part of the Soviet Union, tried to re-find its original identity establishing strong ties with the forgotten homeland. This phenomenon can be defined as deliberate, target-limited de-globalization. The other group, which had been immersed only in what they perceived as a genuine ethnic Armenian existence, aspired to better integrate into their countries of residence to mean and matter more for their homeland, and to be able to efficiently help the new Armenia. The latter can be defined as deliberate, target-limited globalization.

The main priority of ArmeniaՉs foreign policy is a gradual comprehensive integration into the European architecture. However, just as in the Diaspora, the idiosyncrasy of the new republic, with its geography and history being at the crossroads of East, West, South and North, is resting upon several national identities. But as distinct from her world-wide communities, ArmeniaՉs multiple ethno-cultural identities are never in discord with each other. They are harmonized and reconciled in the process of creative multiplication, and not mechanical addition.

In addition to a strong European identity, based upon the language belonging to the Indian ՓEuropean group, Christianity adopted as state religion in 301 AD and large second, third, fourth generation and even centuries- old communities residing in Europe, Armenia has very powerful links to Russia, Iran, the Middle East and the US.

The Middle Eastern dimension in ArmeniaՉs cultural, economic and political life is accounted for by her traditional and the present day ties with Iran and the Arab world, as well as the existence of a more than half a million-strong Armenian community. These factors make Armenia perceive herself not only as a part of the Wider Europe, but they also include her into the geopolitical context of the wider Middle East.

ArmeniaՉs strong affinity with Russia is explained not only by shared religious, cultural values and political heritage, or the presence of 2.5 ml. Armenian community in that country, but, first and foremost by the fact, that after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Russia is perceived by Armenian society at large as one of the main guarantors of its security against a potential Turkish threat. For some quite understandable historical reasons the Republic of Armenia is still a security-conscious country. And finally, due to the recent developments in the bilateral relations, Russia is thought to be a most probable potential investor into ArmeniaՉs economy.

ArmeniaՉs Trans-Atlantic link is provided by the very well organized and quite politicized Armenian-American community, whose political activity is incomparable to that of any other Armenian Diaspora group residing in Russia, the Middle East or Europe. This connection is also nourished by an inborn entrepreneurial spirit and a natural quest for free economic competition, which Armenia and her people never lost even at the times of the Soviet rule. An important addition to the factors that built a US-Armenian bridge has been the recently started cooperation in the security and defense fields between the two countries. This cooperation has been significantly intensified in the post 9.11 time period. Thus, the Russian role of ArmeniaՉs security guarantor might be complemented (not substituted) by the US, if not yet in the perception of the public at large, but as it finds its reflection in the governmentՉs foreign policy agenda.

The principle of complementarity is the foundation stone of the present day ArmeniaՉs foreign policy. It is the effect and the consequence of the causes described above. The phased globalization methodology together with the reconciled multiple cultural, religious, economic, security and political vectors are mirrored in the Armenian foreign policy agenda. The latter is as diverse as the countryՉs and the nationՉs multi-faceted ethnic identity. Complementarity can be also accounted for by the countryՉs survival instincts and the experience accumulated during the centuries of man-made disasters and the stateless existence. This is a desire to keep an active security, political and economic balance in the relationship with the world powers.

ArmeniaՉs geo-strategic identity issue is also very much influenced by the vector of her political orientation. In the present day, there is no need to make a dramatic choice between Russia and the US, because, first, after 9.11 these countries share a common interest not only as far as the global issues are concerned, but also in the context of the South Caucasus, and, second, because Armenia tries to complement her relations with Moscow by her cooperation with Washington. If in the past complementarity has been largely asymmetric,- military and security ties with Russia on the one hand, economic assistance programs and democracy-building with the US on the other,- todayՉs Armenia has proportionate and diversified relationship with both of these countries. Presently, Russia is not only ArmeniaՉs main security guarantor, but the largest potential investor in her economy, whereas in addition to assistance programs, Washington is building a strong security and defense cooperation with Yerevan.

Paradoxical as it sounds, ArmeniaՉs current integration into the European structures (OSCE and the Council of Europe) is by no means based upon identity versus political orientation formula. It is here that the country can afford to make a choice, not taking pains to think about the necessity to keep the balance. This choice is not in discord with the policy of complementarity, which does not cease to exist when the euoropization process is started, but goes parallel to it.

Further globalization, the potential integration of the South Caucasus into the EU, as well as the crystallization of the US-EU and Russia-EU relationships, would, hopefully, once and for all free Armenia from linking her geo-strategic identity issue with the question of political orientation.