By Rouben Shugarian,
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia
Former Ambassador to the US

The paradox of the South Caucasus/Black Sea present day regional identity is that less geography means more geo-politics. This is true not only in the context of general europeanization but also as far as the link to the Greater Middle East is concerned. Currently the region is going through phased europeanization, which is translated into and mirrored in each and every country’s foreign policy agenda. The mirror images of this joint Drang nach Westen are different in each particular case, as are the philosophy, the mind-set, the public policy and the pace of every country representing this part of the world. However, the long-term objective, prompted by the emerging challenges and the logic of the new millennium is the same for the South Caucasus countries and the Black Sea region at large,-a wider Europe of disappearing borders.

What is phased europeanization, how is it translated into the region’s foreign policy agenda, and how can it help to shape the future regional identity? First and foremost, it is the political transfiguration of what was once called Trans-Caucasus into the South Caucasus. The paradox of the situation is that if the region were renamed into the Caucasus without any other geographical indicator, while its landscape would have been widened, its geopolitical semantics would have been narrowed and diminished to a predominantly Russian context. Therefore, this is the case when less is more, or when a smaller territory opens the doors and windows for wider globalization. Today in addition to the Russian connection the South Caucasus region has a clear-cut Iranian link, a Turkish dimension, as well as supra-regional links to the US, EU and the Greater Middle East. Were we to use a presently popular marine terminology describing the regional connections, we could talk about the three Seas, the Caspian, the Black and the Mediterranean, and a clearly-shaped Trans-Atlantic link. This is roughly the first phase of europeanization of the South Caucasus, when it is too early to speak about the new regional identity, and it would probably be more justified to use the term multiple geo-political idiosyncrasies.

The second europeanization phase is the process of the joint integration of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into the European and Euro-Atlantic architecture. This phase is currently underway, because the three countries have already become members of the OSCE and Council of Europe on the one hand, and the PFP, PARP and IPAP on the other. Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood initiatives in which the South Caucasus countries are presently envisaged as would-be participants are auxiliary implements to further promote the process of integration and to eventually bridge the region to the EU. At this stage, it is again too early and too ambitious to speak about the fully-shaped new geopolitical identity of the South Caucasus, and it would be more prudent and relevant to use the term transitional regional identity for the following two reasons.

First, frozen ethnic conflicts inevitably mean frozen regional identity. Thus shaping and elaborating its strategy towards the region, Brussels should pursue two goals. The first, a short-term objective, must be to assist the countries in conflict to try to build a relationship through regional cooperation, based upon soft security programs (customs, fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons, money laundering, etc.), as well as regional environmental initiatives and small, but realistic and manageable trade and business projects. The post- 9.11 reality also creates the necessity and conditions for regional cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. This would have been impossible, were the conflicts in the military phase. But since there is a durable ceasefire that holds for over ten years both in Abkhazian/Georgian and Nagorno Karabagh conflicts, regional cooperation might work not only to promote peace and stability, but to lay a sound ground for the new geo-political identity of the South Caucasus.

A longer-term goal must be to actively support (not to substitute) the existing international mediation formats (the UN and the OSCE respectively) to help the mediators bring final solutions to the regional conflicts. The mediation and facilitation efforts could be, or rather, should be elevated to another level and diversified, but the main negotiation formats must not be changed to maintain the values of the current transitional security equilibrium, accumulated experience and diplomatic continuity.

Second, speaking about the absence of a fully-shaped regional identity of the South Caucasus at this stage, it would once again be prudent to resort to the paradoxical formula of the post-Soviet globalization, or europeanization, -less is more. As it was stated above, the geographically bigger Caucasus region is geo-politically smaller than its own Southern part. In their turn, from the point of view of potential globalization and europeanization individual countries have at times more room to expand than the region as a whole. These individual geo-political quests can rest upon permanent or temporal factors and national identity peculiarities.

Thus, as a nation residing not only in Armenia proper, but spread and scattered around the globe (over 90 countries), Armenia views its Diaspora as a powerful integration vehicle and effective europeanization/globalization means, which cannot be found in the rest of the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region at large. This is complemented by the linguistic factor, Armenian being the only language in the South Caucasus, that belongs to the Indian-European group. Christianity, adopted in Armenia as state religion in 301 AD, is another strong cultural integration incentive shared with Georgia, which makes the pilgrimage of both countries back to the roots all the more natural. This is what we call an individual geo-political quest resting upon permanent factors. It is noteworthy, that in Armenia’s case the country has more room to expand to the Greater Middle East through its strong communities there and through traditional ties with Iran and the Arab world than the South Caucasus as a region. Azerbaijan can, of course, use its membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference as a powerful means to achieve the same goal. Yet it is a risky undertaking for a secular country like the Azerbaijani Republic to capitalize on the Islamic factor without inevitable side effects, except for political lobbying in this organization to get its members on board in addressing the present stand-off with Armenia. A radical tilt to institutional Islamic identity might jeopardize modern Azerbaijan’s aspirations to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Georgia, just like Armenia, views the integration into the European architecture as coming back home. And although this country, the forerunner of new regionalism, was the first to use the term South Caucasus instead of outdated Trans-Caucasus in mid 90s, and the first to come forward with ambitious regional initiatives like Shewardnadze’s Common Caucasus Home, etc., Georgia today, by commission or by omission, is tempted to use the sweet aftertaste of its Revolution of Roses as a demarcation line that makes it look different from the rest of the region. This is what we call a temporal factor, which time and again stimulates the countries of the South Caucasus to seize the momentum and to prefer the individual European integration path to the regional approach. There is nothing wrong about that, as long as it triggers a healthy competition among the countries, which is more or less the case today, and does not turn into a permanent policy line, offered as a role model to the rest of the region. It is noteworthy, that this political occasionalism is not a new phenomenon as far the dynamics of the europeanization of the South Caucasus is concerned. President Shevardnadze was still in his prime, when he took a legitimate advantage of the very much debated and often questioned parity principle then applied by international organizations to Armenia and Azerbaijan because of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabagh problem, and Georgia became the member of the Council of Europe, whereas the other two countries of the region had to wait for two more years.

Azerbaijan’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations are very much synchronized with the processes taking place in Turkey. The ethnic kinship with the latter, its accumulated experience as a NATO member- state, as well as Baku’s regional ambitions based upon oil resources and pipe-lines prompt the logic and the pace of Azerbaijan’s integration into the European architecture.

However, it is during the second europeanization phase of the South Caucasus, the one in which transitional regional identity is shaped and regional awareness first comes to the fore, that the grounds for the future geopolitical unity are laid through the joint endeavors, shared goals and accelerated processes of European integration in which all three countries of the South Caucasus are engaged. This is when the European and Euro-Atlantic involvement should become most crucial and instrumental.

The third europeanization phase for the South Caucasus could be formally started upon the completion of the second one. Informally, this last phase unfolds parallel to it, for it is nothing but a joint search for a renewed European identity, based upon the societal, political and cultural riches of the past and the new security architecture of the present, shared not only between France and Germany or England and Spain, but by Poland and Armenia, Georgia and Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Turkey and stretched and stringed across the four seas, the Black, the Caspian, the Mediterranean and the Baltic. This is also the time when the regional identity of the South Caucasus should come to its completion and reach the full age.

Yet, it would make more sense for this paper to continue to focus on the second europeanization phase, which we already discussed in general terms. This is relevant, because today is the time when crucial decisions have to be made and important steps must be taken both by the Black Sea/ South Caucasus countries and Brussels.

European / Euro-Atlantic integration should be a conscious process where its subjects (not objects) must retain their national identity and personality, adding them to, but not dissolving them in the wider regional context. The reforms in the countries in transition should be a conscious action too, carried out not for promised economic carrots or to please the European institutions, but for the countries’ own good, moving them closer to the European democracy and welfare. Sticks and carrots methodology in connection with the Black Sea/ South Caucasus European integration prospects is very popular in the present day political and academic circles in Europe and overseas. Some even offer to conduct “a sliced carrot policy” with regard to the new neighbors and the future EU members. We have nothing against sticks and carrots and other kinds of possible political step-by-step trade-offs. However, first, if the carrots have to be sliced, so should be the sticks, and, second, while it is fully justified to set up certain standards and criteria that the countries and regions should necessarily meet to join the Club, this should be done in a dignified way through a conscious political, economic and, last but not least, societal transformation.

If it is a must to use a metaphor to describe the reform philosophy in the countries in transition, it should rather sound like a self-made and self-inflicted “golden straight-jacket”. That is why the region’s European integration mid-term priority should not be the EU itself, or the NATO membership the day after tomorrow, but, first and foremost, the EU economic, political and societal standards, which later on will allow to realistically speak about the membership. Having said that, it is relevant to once again resort to the less is more formula, but, of course, in a different sense.

At this stage, alongside with the reforms to be carried out in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea at large, and the certain criteria and standards that have to be met by this region, it is imperative to clarify and crystallize the EU/NATO prioritized list of interests in our region as well. This should definitely be a two-way street. It is a must to assess whether the South Caucasus will be given the privilege to join the Club primarily for economic reasons, as a huge oil resource, or for security considerations, -to “safely” fence Europe against what is frequently called the troubled Middle Eastern neighborhood; or just the contrary, the region is considered to be a part of the enlargement strategy as a potential bridge to the Middle East, facilitating Euro-Atlantic communications and the future relationship with Iran and the Arab world.

A vital question is frequently asked today in academic and political circles during various forums and seminars on the Euro-Atlantic enlargement strategy in the Black Sea/South Caucasus region: “Can the EU say no to the countries which fulfilled or which will have fulfilled their obligations on the road to the membership, as well as to the countries in a quest for virtual enlargement (that is how the New Neighborhood and the Wider Europe initiatives should be called in our opinion)? This no can be too costly for the would-be neighbors and would-be members, and we should try to rule it out through the joint two-way ownership. Or else, Brussels will become a Never-land in a Never-world, while the EU, the Wider Europe and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic architecture shall be perceived as an Exclusive Club, which self-indulgently shuts its doors before inviting the countries in. Then it would be more appropriate to view the South Caucasus, cynical as it sounds, as the EU’s Near Abroad, rather than the neighborhood, old or new.

To avoid this, the countries of the region should no more be perceived as possible recipients only, or enlargement beneficiaries that need to blindly and obediently fulfill certain instructions to qualify and live up to the clearly defined EU standards, receiving the sliced carrot in the meantime.

If the Euro-Atlantic institutions can eventually define what it is that the new neighbors and future members should bring in, and what contribution they can make to the European Security architecture, economic stability or cultural diversity, and what, last but not least, they can add to the new European identity, then the no we talked about will be no more possible.

The second europeanization phase for the Black Sea/South Caucasus countries is reflected in the Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood initiatives on the EU side, and the PFP, PARP and especially the IPAP participation for Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the NATO side.

To operate successfully and efficiently, the Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood are in need of clearly-defined implements and elaborated mechanisms. As regards these initiatives, it is frequently talked today about the importance of financial instrument to fund the cross-border trade and support the neighbors. An academic debate currently unfolds around a possible Free Trade Agreement with the new members and neighbors. In our opinion, the FTA is too long a shot, and we would be shooting over the bow offering it now.

However, the point is valid. Regional cooperation, already discussed in this chapter, as well as financial and trade implements for the European integration process are of key importance, particularly for the neighbor countries in political conflicts, or the countries burdened by the tragic events of the past. One should not try to re-invent the wheel here. The EU can follow the Trans-Atlantic example of the Qualified Industrial Zones originally designed for the Middle East, namely Israel, Palestine and Jordan, and quite recently used for Chile joining the NAFTA through the above-mentioned QIZ-s. These Zones are envisaged largely for high-tech production and textiles to be consumed tax-free in the United States. The same formula might work for the EU in its relations with the new members and neighbors. One cannot overestimate what it can mean for conflict resolution, regional cooperation and the European integration, without extra headaches and side effects for the EU, if tomorrow, Turkey and Armenia, or Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are irrevocably linked through the QIZ-s with a prospect of signing an FTA with a few European countries. It is through such concrete mechanisms and implements that the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region can be effectively merged with a further incorporation into the European architecture. The key to this merging is not the hackneyed truism of ethnic kinship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, but a real improvement of and the eventual rapprochement in the Turkish-Armenian relations. The opening of the borders with Armenia by Ankara through the QIZ-s or through direct talks with Yerevan without any political preconditions will change the whole geo-political identity of the region. Then, speaking about this part of the world, it would be fully justified and relevant to introduce the term Black Sea/ South Caucasus region, which in this chapter is used only to make the further discussion more plausible.

Last year the EU made an important decision of appointing a special representative to the South Caucasus. This step is instrumental in elaborating and promoting the Euro-Atlantic strategy in the region. Yet to make this strategy a real success, the mandate of this representative should be further clarified and enhanced, enabling Ambassador Talvitie to deal not only with the regional security and cooperation issues of the South Caucasus proper, but to put these issues into the wider geo-strategic context of what we conventionally called the Black Sea/ South Caucasus region. Therefore, the target-oriented and consistent facilitation of Turkish-Armenian relations should also be an integral part of his mandate, as well as the priority issue of the Euro-Atlantic regional strategy at large. The unilaterally closed Turkish-Armenian border bears much more geo-political semantics than it is generally deemed. First, it is a demarcation line between the South Caucasus and the Black Sea regions. And, second, this border is a virtual Berlin Wall, that not only separates the two countries, but also means that the South Caucasus and Armenia in particular have a closed border with the NATO, and the potential EU membership candidate country, if, of course, the latter meets the standards and criteria offered by Brussels. The possible argument that the Georgian-Turkish and the Turkish –Azeri borders are open is not relevant here, because, first, they do not provide sufficient geography to make the interaction of the South Caucasus and the Black Sea regions effective and practical, and, second, because this interaction and oft predicted further merging of the two regions are not a matter of geography, but of geo-politics. Baku-Ceyhan pipeline could be a breakthrough, but it does not erase the division lines inside the South Caucasus and with the Black Sea countries. The pipe-line alone cannot provide for all the parts of the regional mosaic to come to a harmonized unity and shape all the pieces of the geo-strategic puzzle into a finished identity picture.

As it was stated above, whereas the long term objective for the South Caucasus countries is the same, -full integration into the European architecture, the methodology, the mind-set, the pace and, last but not least, the public policy of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan might differ. First and foremost, this is right as far as the relations with the NATO are concerned.

While Azerbaijan and Georgia have clearly indicated that joining the NATO is an integral part of their foreign policy agenda, Armenia chose to conduct what could be described as the NATO threshold policy. For Yerevan, each new cooperation stage with the NATO is a matter of thoroughly scrutinized political decision, not a technical or administrative one. However, if we look at the facts on the ground, the three countries of the South Caucasus have made very much the same steps in their relations and cooperation with the NATO. All three countries are in the PFP, PARP and quite recently in the IPAP, while the MAP is presently as remote for Georgia and Azerbaijan, as it is for Armenia. The current threshold of Armenia’s NATO policy is somewhere in between the IPAP and the MAP.

Therefore, whereas regarding the South Caucasus/EU relationship Brussels should be guided by the regional approach and principles of the package deal for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with regard to the NATO it should put at work a country- by- country methodology, paying more attention not to the public policy statements, but to the facts on the ground.

The European integration process takes a lot of effort and time. On the one hand, the countries in transition should try to have less headache and fewer problems when they eventually join the Club, on the other the EU should be freed from legitimate fears and ensured against undesirable complications when or if it is ultimately enlarged. To facilitate the transition process and make it less painful, it appears to be feasible to use the recent experience of the new members of the EU.

The Baltic countries are a real success story as far as the European integration process and the methodology of transition reforms are concerned. In fact, they are a source of optimism and a role model for the countries on the way to Europe, for their integration performance makes the challenges and the tasks, that the South Caucasus region faces today, look less insurmountable and inaccessible. However, their success would not have been so remarkable and quick, were it not for the consistent institutional support of the three Scandinavian countries. The South Caucasus countries have an excellent relationship with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania based not only upon the values of the post- independence era, but resting upon the institutional memory, as well as the shared realities of the common past within the same state. It was during the last year that Lithuania and Estonia came up with two similar initiatives regarding the South Caucasus region. Lithuania offered to establish 3+3 format (three Baltic countries + Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) to facilitate the European integration process for the South Caucasus. Estonia put forward a more ambitious and probably more preferable proposal, a 3+3+3 format (Scandinavian countries+ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania + the South Caucasus) to deal with the transition reforms in our region and to apply and adjust the experience the Baltic countries have accumulated when assisted by Sweden, Denmark and Norway to the realities and conditions of the present day South Caucasus.

In our opinion, both formats can work, if they are thoroughly elaborated and designed not just as a one-time action, in which public relations will be more important than the substance, but as permanently working mechanisms. If one of these formats is established, and it should once again be stressed that 3+3+3 seems to be more feasible, it will definitely need the full support and assistance from the EU headquarters. The EU special representative for the South Caucasus should coordinate the discussions or at least be present at the consultations to be held within the framework of the format described above.

Thus, what we described as the second phase of the South Caucasus integration into the European institutions is crucial not only for the region itself, but also for Brussels, which not only needs to crystallize its interest regarding Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Black Sea context, but to elaborate the Euro-Atlantic strategy, based upon concrete programs and practical steps. These programs, in addition to individual action plans envisaged by the New Neighborhood and the Wider Europe initiatives on the one hand and the IPAP on the other, should focus on regional cooperation, new trade regimes and policy (QIZ-s and FTA-s), security talks aimed to erase the division lines not only within the South Caucasus proper, but those that currently separate the region from the Black Sea, and transition reform mechanisms.

If this europeanization phase of the South Caucasus is successfully completed, and if the present regional awareness is eventually transfigured into the new geo-strategic identity, shared by Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan and reconciled with the Black Sea region at large, there will be no more need to resort to the less is more paradox, because more geography will finally mean more geo-politics.