Venue: Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
Web Site: http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/
Date: 31 October, 2007

In 1991 Barry Buzan, British political scientist, contemplating on the pure model of nationhood questioned the status of statehood as an objective precondition for a nation’s existence. His argument was exemplified by the Armenians, a nation without a state. Ironically, his sample did not last long, since the very same year Armenia becomes independent. However, the potential of the “Armenian case” to contradict pure models seems to be indefatigable. This point assumes real content, when we consider Armenia in the mainstream of world political processes occurring in the last decade of the 20th century. The end of the Cold war that resulted in the disestablishment of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia also manifested itself as the conclusion of centuries’ long evolution of different forms of governances and polities, bringing them to a single surviving model: the nation state.

In 1992, when Armenia and other former Soviet republics gained their seats in the United Nations, nearly the whole world was a family of various nation states. The international system took its final shape towards which it was moving since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. Now - after fifteen years from those landmark changes of the early 1990s - we can assess how much exactly that shape was “final”.

Not surprisingly, as it is the case with many notions and processes, the end of one cycle in international relations brings to the start of another one. Charles Tilly nicely captured this phenomenon while stating that “…states may be following the old routine by which an institution falls into ruin just as it becomes complete”. And so, having gained at last the long aspired independence, Armenia had to build its state institutions without having an undisputed model of a nation state in the changing world.

The emergence of the United Europe encompassing the greatest portion of the continent, the transnational promotion of Western values by the US, Russia’s steady determination to maintain its traditional influence in international politics considerably undermined the conventional understanding of nation state in its most important dimension: absolute sovereignty. At the risk of some oversimplification, we can state that the erosion of the nation state sovereignty is so far being broadly explained by academicians and practitioners as a part of either globalization or clash of civilizations. The latter notion seemingly includes but is not simply reduced to perpetual clashes and confrontations among different civilizations. It largely refers to the ascendance of major regional power centers as main players in the world politics. Hence, simultaneous to the state building process - with all conventional complexities – Armenia found itself amid the tendencies of both globalization and regionalization.

From the very beginning of its independence Armenia has strongly advocated neo-liberal economic globalization, and closely cooperated with its main international institutions and the U.S. In general, Armenia went considerably beyond the majority of former Soviet republics in carrying out IMF and WB prescribed economic and structural reforms. The land reform and the following massive privatization of other sectors of economy were implemented with certain neo-liberal zeal. As a result, even given the hardships of closed land borders with two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia succeeded in creating a flexible and healthy economy. Yet, the sound foundations of economy alone could not guarantee its further development in terms of gaining access to the external markets. For a country with a limited domestic market and scarce resources, active presence in big regional markets is an imperative. Armenia’s economy had to deal with the issue of creating knowledge-based entrepreneurial capacities on its own. Clearly, without consistent expansion to the common markets of the EU and the CIS, and emerging markets in Asia and the Middle East, Armenian economy will lose the momentum to acquire sustainability.

Likewise, political issues Armenia is facing today have strong regional dimension. Strained relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan push Armenia to seek for the long-term solutions in its regional policy. At the same time, international organizations such as OSCE, CIS and EU, which assist in solving these problems, have certain regional underpinning and vocation. Not surprisingly, Armenia’s foreign policy gravitates towards a balancing act between the global and regional tendencies. Consequently, the task that Armenia’s foreign policy is compelled to fulfill is a choice between practical short term gains and a solid conceptual framework for its orientation in the region and the world.

Here perceptions interact with realities and visa versa. These perceptions are shaped by a historical record of being a borderland nation during various historical periods given Armenia’s strategic location at the crossroads between East and West, North and South. As a borderland throughout the history the Armenian kingdoms were integrated into different regional systems, by assuming a peculiar role of a quasi independent “trustworthy alien”. Armenia’s role as “the sole Christian Kingdom of the Caliphate” and “the Oriental Kingdom of Latin Outremere” during the Crusades is a good case in point.

Another reality of Armenia’s past and present is the existence of the worldwide Armenian communities – the Diaspora – which have acquired a global role since the 16-17th centuries. This organizational form of the Armenian people came into existence at the initial phase of global trade, when the Armenian merchants established worldwide trading network. The author of the perpetual peace theory Immanuel Kant was one of the first thinkers who drew the attention to the distinctive character of Armenian Diaspora: “Armenians wander on foot from the borders of China all the way to Cape Corso on the coast of Guinea to carry on commerce… in line from North-East to South-West, they travel through almost whole extent of the ancient continent and know how to secure a peaceful reception by all the peoples they encounter.”.

Why are these two generalizations important for the assessment of Armenia’s foreign policy making? Firstly, both these intrinsic realities remain valid nowadays and happen to form the constants of Armenia’s foreign policy. Our country is a member of various regional initiatives, such as CIS, CSTO, CoE, EU European Neighborhood Policy, and NATO Individual Partnership Programme, trying to develop mutually beneficial relationship with the EU, Russia, and the US. This is a new regionalism posing new challenges and creating new opportunities. It has to be mentioned that the process of regionalization or regional integration does not have a single model. These processes have different speed, multiple layers and finally, quite different purposes and aspirations. From millenarian sentiments of the EU to issue oriented agenda of the SCO, the new regionalization is taking different faces.

In its regional policy Armenia values predictability among other notions and principles in the context of regional integration and development is constantly making efforts to become a trusted partner for the countries, institutions and individuals interested in the region’s stable economic, social and cultural advance based on the universal values of democracy and free market. We have strong belief that new dividing lines in South Caucasus and the region at large undermine the positive component of regional developments that has been formed during these years.

Armenia’s European aspirations are a manifestation of our strong historical and cultural link to Europe and Europeanness, as well as a national urge to evolve into a free modern society that is able to meet the demands of the new century. At the moment, we and our European colleagues are jointly working towards this aim in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy programme.

Secondly, there are more Armenians living abroad than in Armenia proper. The reasons for the existence of modern Armenian Diaspora form a mixture of political and economic factors. The latter factors have already been referred to above. The prevailing political factor in this context is the 1915 Armenian Genocide in Ottoman Turkey, which forced hundred thousands survivors to settle in the US, European countries, as well as in the Middle East and Latin America. Hence, the identity of the Armenian Diaspora was largely shaped by a single political event and centered around the demand for moral and political recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The Diaspora Armenian interest groups are well-organized in the leading countries of the world, particularly in the US. At the same time, these groups are active in introducing the American approaches in Armenia, both regarding Armenia itself and the region at large.

Apparently, Armenia’s foreign policy is bound to search for balancing formulas, keeping in mind the global trends of development and the traditional interests of regional powers. In essence, in seeking these solutions our country chooses an “act and see” behavior over “wait and see” precautious attitude. Armenia tends to meet the challenging controversies in the international politics bridging them in accordance with common sense towards positive cooperation.